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An Assessment of International Legal Issues

PREFACE
This assessment ofintemationallegal issues in infonnation operations reflects
the combined efforts of a superb team of Department of Defense lawyers. It
ca'uld not have been produced without the contributions of representatives of
the General Counsels of the Army, Navy, Air Force, the National Security
Agency and the Defense Infonnation Systems Agency, as well as the Judge Advocates General of the military services and the Legal Counsel to the Chainnan
of the Joint ChiefS of Staff. Their insight, wisdom and persistence have not only
been ofgreat value but have reflected exceeding well on themselves and their offices. The principal draftsman, Phillip A. Johnson (Colonel USAF, Retired), is
owed a note of special appreciation; his scholarship and dedication were truly
extraordinary.
This second edition contains a number of editorial changes, refers to several
events that have occurred since publication of the first edition, including a brief
discussion in Section II of EUTELSAT's actions during the 1999 NATO
bombing campaign in Yugoslavia, adds a paragraph in Section VI concerning
the U.S.-Soviet Dangerous Military Activities Agreement, and-by popular
demand-adds Section XI, Notes for Further Research.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Sources and Application of Intemational Law.
International law consists ofbinding legal obligations among sovereign states.
Two of the basic principles of the international legal system are that sovereign
states are legally equal and independent actors in the world community, and that
they generally assume legal obligations only by affinnatively agreeing to do so.
The most effective instruments in creating international law are international
agreements, which may be either bilateral or multilateral. Some of these agreements, such as the United Nations Charter, establish international institutions
that the parties agree to invest with certain authority. It is also generally accepted
that there is a body of customary international law, which consists of practices
that have been so widely followed by the community ofnations, with the understanding that compliance is mandatory, that they are considered to be legally
obligatory.
International institutions have legislative authority to create legal obligations
for nations only when their member nations have agreed to give them that authority. The most prominent example is the power of the UN Security Council
to pass resolutions requiring individual nations to perfonn or refrain from certain
actions in order to protect or restore international peace and security in the context of a particular situation. The decisions of the International Court ofJustice
are binding upon nations that have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court and are
parties to litigation before it. Other international institutions can also be given
the power to impose binding obligations upon nations that agree to submit to
their authority. In addition, certain actions of some international institutions,
such as the International Court ofJustice and the UN General Assembly, are
considered to be persuasive evidence of the existence ofprinciples of customary
international law .
As with domestic law, the primary mechanism that makes international law
effective is voluntary compliance. Also as with domestic law, the threat of sanctions is often required as well. The international legal system provides institutional enforcement mechanisms such as international litigation before the
International Court ofJustice and other judicial and arbitral tribunals, as well as
the right to petition the United Nations Security Council to authorize coercive
measures to protect or restore international peace and security. The internationallegal system also provides self-help enforcement mechanisms such as the
right to use force in individual and collective self-defense and the right in some
circumstances to repudiate treaty obligations which have been violated by
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another party. An aggrieved nation may always withdraw from voluntary relationships involving diplomatic representation and most kinds of commerce.
Even the right to publicly complain about another nation's illegal behavior may
provide an effective enforcement mechanism ifsuch complaints generate diplomatic costs for the offending nation.
ChiefJustice Oliver Wendell Holmes once wrote, "The life of the law has
not been logic; it has been experience." It seldom happens that a legislature foresees a problem before it arises and puts into place a legislative solution before it is
needed. More typically, legislators react to a problem that has already manifested
itsel£ The international legal system operates in the same manner. The international community ordinarily does not negotiate treaties to deal \vith problems
until their consequences have begun to be felt. This is not all bad, since the solution can be tailored to the actual problems that have occurred, rather than to a
range of hypothetical possibilities. One consequence, however, is that the resulting law, whether domestic or international, may be sharply influenced by the
nature of the events that precipitate legal developments, together \vith all their
attendant policy and political considerations.
The development of international law concerning artificial earth satellites
provides a good example. If the nations had sat down with perfect foresight and
asked themselves, "Should we permit those nations among us that have access to
advanced technology to launch satellites into orbits that will pass over the territorie~ of the rest of us and take high-resolution imagery, eavesdrop on our telecommunications, record weather information, and broadcast information
directly to telephones and computers within our borders?", a very restrictive
regime of space law might have resulted. Instead, what happened was that the
first satellites launched by the Soviet Union and the United States were seen as
entirely benign devices engaged in scientific research, and it was also perfectly
clear that no nation had the capability to interfere with them as they passed over
its territory. In these circumstances, it quickly became accepted customary international law, soon enshrined in the Outer Space Treaty, that objects in orbit
were beyond the territorial claims ofany nation, and that outer space is available
for exploitation by all.
The history of space law contrasts sharply with that of air law. Much of the
early development of heavier-than-air aviation coincided \vith the First World
War, during which the military power of aircraft for collecting intelligence, attacking ground forces, and bombing enemy cities was clearly demonstrated. The
result was a highly restricted regime ofair law in which any entry into a nation's
airspace without its permission was to be regarded as a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
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Similarly, we can make some educated guesses as to how the international legal system will respond to information operations, but the direction that response actually ends up taking may depend a great deal on the nature of the
events that draw the nations' attention to the issue. If information operations
techniques are seen as just another new technology that does not gready threaten
the nations' interests, no dramatic legal developments may occur. Ifthey are seen
as a revolutionary threat to the security of nations and the welfare of their citizens, it will be much more likely that efforts will be made to restrict or prohibit
information operations by legal means. These are considerations that national
leaders should understand in making decisions on using information operations
techniques in the current formative period, but it should also be understood that
the course of future events is often beyond the control of statesmen.
The actors in the international legal system are sovereign states. International
legal obligations and international enforcement mechanisms generally do not
apply to individual persons except where a nation enforces certain principles of
international law through its domestic criminal law, or in a very limited class of
serious offenses (war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and crimes
against peace) that the nations have agreed may be tried and punished by international criminal tribunals.
B. Essentials of Treaty Law.
In domestic U.S. law there are important distinctions between treaties and
executive agreements. This distinction primarily involves issues of Constitutional authority within the U.S. government, but it is oflitde importance internationally. Treaties and executive agreements are equally binding between the
United States and the other party or parties to an international agreement. We
will use the term "treaty" in this paper as a shorthand way ofreferring to all forms
oflegally binding state-to-state international agreements.
Treaty obligations are binding on their parties, but international law recognizes certain circumstances in which a nation can regard a treaty obligation as
being suspended, modified, or terminated. The parties can always modify or terminate a treaty by mutual consent. Some international agreements expire by
their own terms after a fixed period of time. Generally, unless the terms of the
agreement establish a right of unilateral withdrawal, a nation may not unilaterally repudiate or ,vithdraw from a treaty unless it has a basis for doing so that is
recognized under international law. Treaty obligations are reciprocal in nature.
If one ofthe parties commits a material breach ofits obligations under the treaty,
the other may be entided to suspend its own compliance, or to withdraw from
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the agreement entirely. Also, a fundamental change in circumstances may justify
a decision by one of the parties to regard its treaty obligations as suspended or
terminated.
One of these fundamental changes of circumstance is the initiation of armed
hostilities between the parties. Some international agreements specifically provide that they will remain in effect during armed conflict between the parties,
such as law of war treaties and the United Nations Charter. Most treaties, however, are silent on whether or not they will continue to apply during hostilities
between the parties. Many peacetime agreements facilitate tourism, transportation, commerce, and other relationships the continuation of which would be
fundamentally inconsistent with a state of armed conflict between the parties.
Agreements on other subjects, such as boundary settlements and reciprocal
rights of inheritance of private property, may be unrelated to the existence of
hostilities and may ultimately be determined to remain in full force. The issues
involved may be particularly complicated when the treaty concerned is multilateral, rather than bilateral. When two parties to a multilateral treaty are engaged
in armed conflict, the result may well be that the effect of the treaty is suspended
between the belligerents, but remains in effect among each belligerent and the
other parties. We will see later in this paper that the United States is a party to a
variety of bilateral and multilateral agreements containing obligations that may
affect information operations. One of our tasks will be to determine as best we
can which of these agreements are likely to remain in effect during hostilities.
The tests we will apply are (1) whether there is specific language in the treaty addressing its effect during hostilities between the parties, and (2) if there is no such
language, whether the object and purpose of the treaty is or is not compatible
with a state of armed hostilities between the parties.

C. New Legal Challenges Presented by Information Operations.
Many traditional military activities are included in current concepts of"information operations" and "information warfare," including physical attacks on information systems by traditional military means, psychological operations,
military deception, and "electronic warfare" operations such as jamming radar
and radio signals. The application of international law to these traditional kinds
of operations is reasonably well settled. Similarly, electro-magnetic pulse (EMP)
weapons and directed-energy weapons such as lasers, micro-wave devices, and
high energy radio frequency (HERF) guns will probably operate in a manner
similar enough to that of traditional weapons that one could apply existing legal
principles to them without much difficulty. It will not be as easy to apply existing
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international law principles to information attack, a term used to describe the use
of electronic means to gain access to or change information in a targeted information system without necessarily damaging its physical components. One of
the principal forms of information attack is likely to be computer network attack, or in today's vernacular, the "hacking" of another nation's computer
systems.
The proliferation of global electronic communications systems and the increased interoperability of computer equipment and operating systems have
greatly improved the utility ofall kinds ofinformation systems. At the same time,
these developments have made information systems that are connected to any
kind of network, whether it be the Internet or some other radio or hard-wired
communications system, vulnerable to computer network attacks. Moreover,
global communications are almost seamlessly interconnected and virtually instantaneous, as a result of which distance and geographical boundaries have become essentially irrelevant to the conduct of computer network attacks. The
result is that many information systems are subject to computer network attack
anywhere and anytime. The attacker may be a foreign state, an agent ofa foreign
state, an agent of a non-governmental entity or group, or an individual acting
for purely private purposes. The equipment necessary to launch a computer network attack is readily available and inexpensive, and access to many computer
systems can be obtained through the Internet or through another network to
which access is'obtained.
One major implication is that it may be very difficult to attribute a particular
computer network attack to a foreign state, and to characterize its intent and
motive. For the purposes of analysis we will initially assume away issues of attribution and characterization, returning to them near the end of the analysis. Another major implication is that an attacker may not be physically present at the
place where the effects ofthe attack are felt. The means ofattack may not be tangibly present either, except in the form of anonymous and invisible radio waves
or electrons. This will complicate the application of traditional rules ofinternational law that developed in response to territorial invasions and attacks by
troops, aircraft, vehicles, vessels, and kinetic weapons that the victim could see
and touch, and whose sponsor was usually readily apparent.
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TI. THE LAW OF WAR
A. Essentials of the Law of War.
The tenus "law of war" and "law of armed conflict" are synonymous. The
latter term has the virtue that it more clearly applies to all international armed
conflicts, whether or not they are formally declared wars. "Law of war" is
shorter and more familiar, and we will use it in this paper. The application of the
law ofwar does not generally depend on which of the parties was at fault in starting the conflict. The law ofwar applies whenever there is a state ofinternational
armed conflict, and it applies in the same manner to all the parties to the conflict.
There is a small subset of the law of war that applies to noninternational armed
conflicts such as civil wars, but those sorts of conflict are not immediately relevant to this paper and will not be discussed. As with other branches of internationallaw, the law of war is composed of treaties and customary international
law. The United States is a party to eighteen law ofwar treaties, along with their
various annexes and protocols, and several more law of war agreements are
pending before the Senate. The United States also recognizes the existence of a
considerable body of customary law of war.
The general principles of the law ofwar have been e:l>."pressed in various ways,
but their essence can be said to be as follows:
• Distinction of combatants from noncombatants: With very limited exceptions, only members of a nation's regular armed forces are entitled to use force
against the enemy. They must distinguish themselves from noncombatants, and
they must not use noncombatants or civilian property to shield themselves from
attack. Iflawful combatants are captured by the enemy they may not be punished for their combatant acts, so long as they complied with the law of war.
They are required to be treated humanely in accordance with agreed standards
for the treatment of prisoners of war, and they must be released promptly at the
cessation of hostilities. Persons who commit combatant acts without authorization are subject to criminal prosecution.
• Military necessity: Enemy military forces are declared hostile. They may be
attacked at will, along with their equipment and stores. Civilians and civilian
property that make a direct contribution to the war effort may also be attacked,
along with objects whose damage or destruction would produce a military advantage because of their nature, location, purpose, or use. A corollary of this
principle is that noncombatants and civilian objects making no direct
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contribution to the war effort, and whose destruction would provide no significant military advantage to the attacker, are immune from deliberate attack.
• Proportionality: When an attack is made against a lawful military target, collateral injury and damage to noncombatants and civilian property may be unavoidable. Attacks may be carried out against lawful military targets even ifsome
amount ofcollateral damage is foreseeable, unless the foreseeable collateral damage is disproportionate to the military advantage likely to be attained. The military advantage to be gained from an attack refers to an attack considered as a
whole rather than only from isolated or particular parts of an attack. Generally,
"military advantage" is not restricted to tactical gains, but is linked to the full
context of war strategy. The commander ordering the attack is responsible for
making the proportionalityjudgment. The calculus may be affected somewhat if
the enemy has failed to carry out his duty to separate his troops and equipment
from noncombatants and civilian property, since in such circumstances the defender must shoulder much of the blame for any collateral damage that results. A
corollary of the principle ofproportionality is that the attacker has a responsibility to take reasonable steps to find out what collateral damage a contemplated attack may cause.
• Superfluous injury: The nations have agreed to ban certain weapons because
they cause superfluous injury. Among these are "dum-dum" bullets, projectiles
filled with glass or other nondetectable fragments, poisoned weapons, and laser
weapons specifically designed to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced
vision.
• Indiscriminate weapons: The nations have agreed to ban certain other weapons because they cannot be directed with any precision against combatants.
Among these are bacteriological weapons and poison gas.
• Perfidy: The law of war provides certain visual and electronic symbols to
identify persons and property that are protected from attack. Among these are
prisoners of war and prisoner ofwar camps, the wounded and sick, and medical
personnel, vehicles, aircraft, and vessels. Any misuse of these protected symbols
to immunize a lawful military target from attack constitutes the war crime of
perfidy. Suppression ofsuch acts is necessary to preserve the effectiveness ofsuch
symbols, since known misuse may lead the combatants to disregard them. For
similar reasons, it is unlawful to feign surrender, illness, or death to gain an
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advantage in combat, as well as to broadcast a false report of a cease-fire or
armistice.
• Neutrality: Nations not engaged in a conflict may declare themselves to be
neutral. A neutral nation is entided to immunity from attack by the belligerents,
so long as the neutral nation satisfies its obligation not to assist either side. If a
neutral nation is unable or unwilling to halt the use of its territory by one of the
belligerents in a manner that gives it a military advantage, the other belligerent
may have a right to attack its enemy in the neutral's territory. There is considerable support for the argument that the concept of neutrality has no application
during a conflict in which one of the belligerents is a nation or coalition of nations authorized by the UN Security Council to use armed force to protect or
restore international peace and security. This conclusion is based upon Article
49 of the Charter, which provides, "The Members of the United Nations shall
join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by
the Security Council." In other situations, however, as when a nation uses
armed force in individual or collective self-defense without the benefit of a Security Council mandate, it would appear that nations not involved in the conflict retain the option of declaring themselves to be neutral.

B. Application to Information Operations.
It is by no means clear what information operations techniques will end up
being considered to be "weapons," or what kinds ofinformation operations will
be considered to constitute armed conflict. On the other hand, those issues may
not end up being particularly important to the analysis oflaw ofwar issues. If the
deliberate actions of one belligerent cause injury, death, damage, and destruction to the military forces, citizens, and property of the other belligerent, those
actions are likely to be judged by applying traditional law of war principles.
• Distinction of combatants from noncombatants: This rule grew up when
combatants could see each other and make a judgment of whether or not to
open fire based in part on whether or not the individual in the sights wore an enemy uniform. When the unit of combat came to be a vessel, tank, truck, or aircraft, it became more important that such vehicles be properly marked than that
their occupants wear a distinctive uniform. If a computer network attack is
launched from a location far from its target, it may be of no practical significance
whether the "combatant" is wearing a uniform. Nevertheless, the law ofwarrequires that lawful combatants be trained in the law of war, that they serve under
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effective discipline, and that they be under the conunand of officers responsible
for their conduct. This consideration argues for retaining the requirement that
combatant information operations during international armed conflicts be conducted only by members ofthe armed forces. Ifcombatant acts are conducted by
unauthorized persons, their government may be in violation of the law of war,
depending on the circumstances, and the individuals concerned are atleast theoretically subject to criminal prosecution either by the enemy or by an international war crimes tribunal. The long-distance and anonymous nature of
computer network attacks may make detection and prosecution unlikely, but it
is the firmly established policy of the United States that U.S. forces will fight in
full compliance with the law of war.
• Military necessity: In developed nations both military and civilian infrastructures are vulnerable to computer network attacks. During an armed conflict virtually all military infrastructures will be lawful targets, but purely civilian
infrastructures must not be attacked unless the attacking force can demonstrate
that a definite military advantage is expected from the attack. Stock exchanges,
banking systems, universities, and similar civilian infrastructures may not be attacked simply because a belligerent has the ability to do so. In a long and protracted conflict, damaging the enemy's economy and research and development
capabilities may well inhibit its war effort, providing a lawful basis on which to
target such capabilities. In a short and limited conflict, however, it would be
hard to articulate any e>'l'ected military advantage from attacking purely economic targets. Targeting analysis must be conducted for computer network attacks just as it traditionally has been conducted for attacks using traditional
weapons.
• Proportionality: During Desert Storm, one of the earliest targets of the
coalition bombing campaign was the electrical power system in Baghdad. Considering the important military uses being made ofelectricity from that system, it
was clearly a lawful military target. The Iraqi government then made a public
pronouncement that the coalition's attack on the city's electrical power system
constituted an act of attempted genocide. The logic of this position was that the
city's sewage system depended on electric pumping stations, so when the electricity went out the sewage system backed up and created a threat of epidemic
disease. No one took this claim very seriously, but this incident highlights the
fact that when an attack is made on an infrastructure that is being used for both
military and civilian purposes the commander will not be in a proper position to
weigh the proportionality of the expected military advantage against the
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foreseeable collateral damage unless the commander has made a reasonable effort
to discover whether the system is being used for civilian purposes that are essential to public health and safety. This principle operates in exacdy the same way
whether the attack is carried out using traditional weapons or in the form of a
computer network attack.
As stated above, the law ofwar places much of the responsibility for collateral
damage on a defending force that has failed to properly separate military targets
from noncombatants and civilian property. When military officials decide to use
civilian infrastructure for military purposes (or vice-versa), they ought to consider the fact that such action may make that infrastructure a lawful military target. There may be no choice, as when military traffic has to move on civilian
highways and railroads. There may be litde alternative to military use of civilian
communications systems, since it is impractical to put into place dedicated military communications systems that have sufficient capacity to carry all military
communications. Where there is a choice, however, military systems should be
kept separate from infrastructures used for essential civilian purposes.
Military command and control systems have long been recognized as lawful
military targets. Civilian media generally are not considered to be lawful military
targets, but circumstances may make them so. In both Rwanda and Somalia, for
example, civilian radio broadcasts urged the civilian population to commit acts
of violence against members of other tribes, in the case of Rwanda, or against
UN-authorized forces providing humanitarian assistance, in the case ofSomalia.
When it is determined that civilian media broadcasts are direcdy interfering with
the accomplishment of a military force's mission, there is no law of war objection to using the minimum necessary force to shut them down. The extent to
which force can be used for purely psychological operations purposes, such as
shutting down a civilian radio station for the sole purpose of undermining the
morale of the civilian population, is an issue that has yet to be addressed authoritatively by the international community.
• Superfluous injury: We are not aware that any weapon or device yet conceived specifically for use in information operations has any potential for causing
superfluous injury, but new systems should always be reviewed ,vith an eye to
their potential for causing catastrophic and untreatable injuries to human beings
to an extent not required by military necessity.
• Indiscriminate weapons: The prohibition on indiscriminate weapons may
apply to information operations techniques such as malicious logic, as when
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malicious logic launched against a military infonnation system spreads to other
infonnation systems being used to provide essential services to noncombatants.
It might also apply ifmalicious logic spreads to infonnation systems belonging to
neutral or friendly nations. Finally, it might be applied indirectly if the consequence of a computer network attack is to release dangerous forces, such as
opening the floodgates ofa dam, causing an oil refinery in a populated area to explode in flames, or causing the release of radioactivity.
• Perfidy: It may seem attractive for a combatant vessel or aircraft to avoid being attacked by broadcasting the agreed identification signals for a medical vessel
or aircraft, but such actions would be a war crime. Similarly, it might be possible
to use computer "morphing" techniques to create an image of the enemy's chief
of state informing his troops that an armistice or cease-fire agreement had been
signed. If false, this would also be a war crime.
• Neutrality: If a neutral nation permits its infonnation systems to be used by
the military forces ofone of the belligerents, the other belligerent generally has a
right to demand that it stop doing so. Ifthe neutral refuses, or iffor some reason it
is unable to prevent such use by a belligerent, the other belligerent may have a
limited right ofself-defense to prevent such use by its enemy. It is quite foreseeable, for example, that a belligerent might demand that a neutral nation not provide satellite imagery of the belligerent's forces to its enemy, or that the neutral
cease providing real-time weather infonnation or precision navigation services.
There appears, however, to be a limited exception to this principle for communications relay systems. The primary international agreement concerning
neutrality, the 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral
Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, to which the United States is a party,
provides in Articles 8 and 9 that "A neutral Power is not called upon to forbid or
restrict the use on behalfofthe belligerents of telegraph or telephone cables or of
,vireless telegraph apparatus belonging to it or to Companies or private individuals," so long as such facilities are provided impartially to both belligerents. The
plain language of this agreement would appear to apply to communication satellites as well as to ground-based facilities.
There is nothing in this agreement, however, that would suggest that it applies to systems that generate infonnation, rather than merely relay communications. These would include the satellite imagery, weather, and navigation
systems mentioned above, as well as other kinds of intelligence-producing systems such as signals intelligence and hydrophonic systems. For example, if a
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belligerent nation demanded that the U.S. government deny GPS navigation
services to its enemy, and if the U.S. were unable or unwilling to comply, the
belligerent may have the right to take necessary and proportional acts in
self-defense, such as jamming the GPS signal in the combat area.
International consortia present special problems. Information systems built
around space-based components require such huge investments and access to
such advanced technology that even developed nations prefer to share the costs
with other nations. Where an international communications system is developed by a military alliance such as NATO, few neutrality issues are likely to arise.
Other international consortia, however, provide satellite communications and
weather data that are used for both civilian and military purposes, and they have
a breadth of membership that virtually guarantees that not all members of the
consortium will be allies in future conflicts. Some current examples are
INTELSAT, INMARSAT, ARABSAT, EUTELSAT, and EUMETSAT.
NATO operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the Spring of 1999
present a striking case in which EUTELSAT, the majority of whose membership is comprised of NATO members, after two months of the bombing campaign, agreed to stop broadcasting Serbian television programs hostile to the
NATO mission. The broadcasting at issue materially contributed to the campaign ofSerbian human rights violations and thus was deemed inconsistent ,vith
EUTELSAT principles.
Some readers may recall that there was an issue among the members of the
INMARSAT consortium providing mobile communications services as to
what use could be made of the system by the members' military forces under a
provision of the INMARSAT agreement stating that the mobile communications service provided by the system could be used" exclusively for peaceful purposes." This issue has largely disappeared because of the recent privatization of
the INMARSAT system. The agreements establishing the new privatized system continue to provide that the management and board of the new
INMARSAT must "have regard to" certain principles, including "acting exclusively for peaceful purposes, taking into account the past practices ofthe Organization and the practice of the Company," and that "[t]he Company shall act
exclusively for peaceful purposes." However, this language establishes no enforceable obligation, and no legal remedy is provided for any third party. A recent opinion by the Office of General Counsel of COMSAT, which continues
to represent the United States in the new INMARSAT, notes that neither
INMARSAT or INTELSAT have ever denied service to the military forces ofa
member nation, and it concludes, "COMSAT envisions no circumstances in
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which the 'peaceful purposes' principle would be invoked as a reason to deny
service to the u.s. Department of Defense or units thereo£"
C. Assessment.
There are novel features of information operations that will require expansion and interpretation of the established principles of the law ofwar. Nevertheless, the outcome of this process of extrapolation appears to be reasonably
predictable. The law of war is probably the single area of intemationallaw in
which current legal obligations can be applied with the greatest con£dence to
information operations.
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ill. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF
FORCE IN "PEACETIME"
A. International Law Concerning the Use of Force among Nations.
As discussed above, the law ofwar authorizes a nation engaged in an international armed conflict to employ armed force to attack lawful military targets belonging to the enemy. Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) may also authorize the use ofarmed force as provided in the UN Charter. The focus of this section, however, is on the application ofinternational law
principles in circumstances where there is neither a state of armed conflict nor a
UNSC mandate--i.e., in peacetime, including the conduct of military operations other than war.
An exploration of the manner in which international law on the use of force
among nations is likely to apply to peacetime computer intrusions will serve
three distinct purposes: (1) it will enable a government that is resolved to conduct itself in scrupulous compliance with international law to avoid activities
that are likely to be regarded by the target nation and the world community as
violations of international law; (2) it will enable a government contemplating
activities that might be considered to violate international law to weigh the risks
ofsuch actions; and (3) it will enable a government that is the victim ofan information attack to identifY the remedies afforded to it by international law, including appeals to the Security Council, the use of force in self-defense, and other
self-help remedies not involving the use of force.
The frequendy-heard question, "Is a computer network attack an act of
war?" invokes an obsolete concept not mentioned in the UN Charter and seldom heard in modem diplomatic discourse. An act of war is a violation of another nation's rights under international law that is so egregious that the victim
would be justified in declaring war. Declarations of war have fallen into disuse,
and the act ofwar concept plays no role in the modem international legal system.
In any event, significant sanctions may follow from much less serious violations
of another nation's rights that would not be regarded as acts of war.
The members of the United Nations have agreed in Article 2 (4) of the UN
Charter to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use offorce
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
This obligation is elaborated in the Declaration on Principles oJlnternational Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the
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Charter of the United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 2625 (1970), which
provides in part:
• "A war ofaggression constitutes a crime against the peace for which there is
responsibility under international law."
• "States have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of
force."
• "Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting
or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the
commission ofsuch acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph
involve a threat or use of force."
• "Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as enlarging or diminishing in any way the scope ofthe provisions ofthe Charter concerning
cases in which the use of force is lawful."
NOTE: The United States has often expressed the view that most General
Assembly resolutions are only recommendations, but that in exceptional cases
particular General Assembly resolutions that are meant to be declaratory of internationallaw, are adopted with the support of all members, and are observed
by the practice of states, are persuasive evidence of customary international law
on a particular subject. Representatives of the United States have on several occasions publicly endorsed the Declaration on Friendly Relations as one of the
few General Assembly resolutions that the United States regards as an authoritative restatement of customary international law, at least until the practice of
states fails to demonstrate that they consider its principles to be legally binding.
In its 1974 "Definition of Aggression" Resolution, the General Assembly
further provided:
• Article 1. Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence ofanother State, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as
set out in this Definition.
• Article 2. The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the
Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression
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although the Security Council may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude that a determination that an act of aggression has been committed
would not be justified in the light of other relevant circumstances, including the fact that the acts concerned or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity.
• Article 3. Any ofthe following acts, regardless ofa declaration ofwar, shall,
subject to and in accordance with the provisions of Article 2, qualify as an
act of aggression:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory
of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of
force of the territory of another State or part thereof;
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of
another State or the use ofany weapons by a State against the territory of
another State;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of
another State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces ofa State on the land, sea or air forces,
or marine and air fleets of another State;
(e) The use ofarmed forces ofone State which are within the territory of
another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention ofthe conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of
their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the
agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at
the disposal ofanother State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State;
(g) The sending by or on behalfofa State ofarmed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts ofarmed force against another
State ofsuch gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.
NOTE: The United States delegation noted that the text of this resolution
reflected hard bargaining among the 35 states that were members of the Special
Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression. Mter the resolution was
adopted by the General Assembly without a vote, the U.S. delegation stated the
view that the resolution did not establish rights and obligations ofstates, but that
it was "likely to provide useful guidance" to the Security Council. Translated,
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this statement appears to indicate that the United States does not regard the language of this resolution as a completely authoritative restatement of customary
international law, but that its essential concepts are correct. In any event, the
question of what constitutes an "act of aggression" is unlikely to be as useful for
our purposes as is the question, what kinds ofinformation attacks are likely to be
considered by the world community to be "armed attacks" and "uses offorce."
Turning to the question of when force may lawfully be used by nations, the
United Nations Charter provides that in some circumstances the Security
Council may authorize the use ofcoercive measures, including military force:
• Article 39. The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act ofaggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
• Article 41. The Security Council may decide what measures not involving
the use ofarmed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and
it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
• Article 42. Should the Security Council consider that measures provided
for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it
may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of
Members of the United Nations.
Perhaps most significandy, the Charter also provides in Article 51, "Nothing
in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."
Read together, these provisions of the Charter and the related General Assembly resolutions provide a myriad of terms and concepts concerning prohibited uses of force among nations, including the threat or use of force, acts of
aggression, wars of aggression, the use of armed force, acts of armed force,
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invasion, attack, bombardment, and blockade. These acts may be directed at the
victim nation's territorial integrity or political independence, or against its military forces or marine or air fleets. They all have in common the presence of
troops and the use oftraditional military weapons. The question before us is how
they are likely to apply to computer network attacks.
Further, when one looks for provisions describing a sanction or remedy, only
two provisions present themselves: the authority of the Security Council to authorize various sanctions, including the use of the members' armed forces, when
it finds there is a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression;"
and Article 51's recognition of the inherent right ofself defense "if an armed attack occurs."
There is no requirement that a "threat to the peace" take the form of an
armed attack, a use offorce, or any other condition specified in the charter. The
Security Council has the plenary authority to conclude that virtually any kind of
conduct or situation constitutes a "threat to the peace" in response to which it
can authorize remedial action of a coercive nature. Nothing would prevent the
Security Council from finding that a computer network attack was a "threat to
the peace" ifit determined that the situation warranted such action. It seems unlikely that the Security Council would take action based on an isolated case of
state-sponsored computer intrusion producing litde or no damage, but a computer network attack that caused widespread damage, economic disruption, and
loss of life could well precipitate action by the Security Council. The debate in
such a case would more likely center on the offender's intent and the consequences of the offending action than on the mechanism by which the damage
was done.
The language ofArticle 51, on the other hand, requires an "armed attack." A
close parsing of the language would tend to limit its effect to attacks and invasions using traditional weapons and forces. On the other hand, there is a
well-established view that Article 51 did not create the right of self-defense, but
that it only recognized a pre-existing and inherent right that is in some respects
broader than the language of Article 51.
History has also seen the emergence ofsuch derivative doctrines as "anticipatory self-defense" and "self-defense in neutral territory," both of which have
been relied upon by the United States in certain circumstances. "Anticipatory
self-defense" permits a nation to strike the first blow ifit has good reason to conclude that it is about to be attacked. The]CS Standing Rules ofEngagement implement this doctrine in their authorization of the use of force in response to a
demonstration of "hostile intent" by an adversary. "Self-defense in neutral territory" is the right to use force to neutralize a continuing threat located in the
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territory of a neutral state, but not acting on its behalf, when the neutral state is
unable or unwilling to fulfill its responsibility to prevent the use ofits territory as
a base or sanctuary for attacks on another nation. This doctrine has venerable
roots in U.S. foreign and defense policy, dating at least to the Caroline incident.
In December 1837, Canada, which was still a British colony, was fighting an insurrection. More than 1,000 insurgents were encamped on both the Canadian
and U.S. sides of the Niagara River. A small steamer, the Caroline, was used by
the insurgents to travel across and along the river. On the night ofDecember 19,
1837, a party of British troops crossed the Niagara and attacked the Caroline in
the port of Schlosser, New York, setting the vessel on fire and casting it adrift
over the Niagara Falls. One U.S. citizen was killed on the dock, another was
missing, and several others were wounded. The United States demanded reparations. The British Government responded that it had acted in self-defense. Secretary of State Daniel Webster agreed that the doctrine ofself-defense in neutral
territory was a valid principle ofinternational law, but asserted that it did not apply in the circumstances ofthis case. Britain continued to maintain that its action
was legal, but nonetheless apologized for the invasion ofU.S. territory. No reparations were paid.
In 1986 the United States bombed Libya as a response to Libya's continuing
support for terrorism against U.S. military forces and other U.S. interests. In
June 1993 U.S. forces attacked the Iraqi military intelligence headquarters because the government of Iraq had conspired to assassinate former President
Bush. In August 1998 U.S. cruise missiles struck a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan and a chemical plant in Sudan in which chemical weapons had been
manufactured. The rationale articulated for each of these actions was
self-defense. Acts of self-defense "must satisfy the tests of necessity and proportionality, but there is no requirement that an act of self-defense use the same
means, or target the same type of object, or otherwise be symmetrical to the
provocation, or that the action taken be contemporaneous with the provocation, particularly ifthe attacker is responding to a continuing course ofconduct.

B. Acts not Amounting to the Use afForce.
In its 1949 decision in the Corfu Channel Case, the ICJ ruled that the intrusion
ofBritish warships into Albanian territorial waters, which it found to have been
without justification under any principle ofinternational law, constituted a violation ofAlbania's territorial sovereignty. The result seems to be recognition ofa
general international law of trespass, although the remedy may be limited to a
declaratory judgment that the victim's rights have been violated.
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The IC]'s predecessor, the Pennanent Court ofInternational Justice, in its
1928 Chorzow Factory Decision, declared that reparations were due to any nation
whose rights under international law were violated by another nation. This concept is often referred to as the doctrine of state responsibility.
There is also a general recognition of the right ofa nation whose rights under
international law have been violated to take countenneasures against the offending state, in circumstances where neither the provocation nor the response involves the use ofanned force. For example, an arbitral tribunal in 1978 ruled that
the United States was entided to suspend French commercial air flights into Los
Angeles after the French had suspended U.S. commercial air flights into Paris.
Discussions of the doctrine of countenneasures generally distinguish between
countenneasures that would otherwise be violations of treaty obligations or of
general principles ofinternational law (in effect, reprisals not involving the use of
anned force) and retorsions-actions that may be unfriendly or even damaging,
but which do not violate any international legal obligation. The use of countermeasures is subject to the same requirements of necessity and proportionality as
apply to self-defense. Some examples of countenneasures that have been generally accepted as lawful are the suspension ofdiplomatic relations, trade and communications embargoes, cutting offforeign aid, blocking assets belonging to the
other nation, and prohibiting travel to or from the other nation.
The international law doctrines ofself-defense, reprisal, and countenneasures
all require that a nation invoking them do so with the intent of protecting itself
against further harm, either by direcdy blocking further hostile acts against itself
or by persuading its tonnentor to cease and desist. The motive must be protection of the nation or its citizens or other national interests from further
hann-the satisfaction of extracting revenge, by itself, is not acceptable. These
doctrines also demand that a state do only what is necessary and proportional in
the circumstances.
In summary, it appears that one trend in international law is to provide some
kind of remedy for every violation of a nation's rights under international law.
Some of these remedies are in the nature ofself-help, such as anned self-defense,
the interruption of commercial or diplomatic relations, or public protest. Other
remedies may be sought from international institutions, such as an imposition of
coercive measures by the Security Council, or a declaratory judgment or an order to make reparations from an international tribunal. The issue for the victim is
to choose the most effective available sanction. The issue for a nation contemplating an action that may be considered to violate the rights of another nation
under international law is to accurately predict what sanctions such action may
provoke.
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C. Application to Computer Network Attacks.
There is no way to be certain how these principles ofinternationallaw will be
applied by the international community to computer network attacks. As with
other developments in international law, much will depend on how the nations
and international institutions react to the particular circumstances in which these
issues are raised for the first time. Ifwe were to limit ourselves to the language of
Article 51, the obvious question would be, "Is a computer network attack an
'armed attack' that justifies the use offorce in self-defense?" Ifwe focused on the
means used, we might conclude that electronic signals imperceptible to human
senses don't closely resemble bombs, bullets, or troops. On the other hand, it
seems likely that the international community will be more interested in the
consequences of a computer network attack than in its mechanism. It might be
hard to sell the notion that an unauthorized intrusion into an unclassified information system, without more, constitutes an armed attack. On the other hand, if
a coordinated computer network attack shuts down a nation's air traffic control
system along with its banking and financial systems and public utilities, and
opens the floodgates of several dams resulting in general flooding that causes
\videspread civilian deaths and property damage, it may well be that no one
would challenge the victim nation ifit concluded that it was a victim ofan armed
attack, or of an act equivalent to an armed attack. Even if the systems attacked
were unclassified military logistics systems, an attack on such systems might seriously threaten a nation's security. For example, corrupting the data in a nation's
computerized systems for managing its military fuel, spare parts, transportation,
troop mobilization, or medical supplies may seriously interfere with its ability to
conduct military operations. In short, the consequences are likely to be more
important than the means used.
If the international community were persuaded that a particular computer
network attack or a pattelu ofsuch attacks should be considered to be an "armed
attack," or equivalent to an armed attack, it would seem to follow that the victim
nation would be entitled to respond in self-defense either by computer network
attack or by traditional military means in order to disable the equipment and personnel that were used to mount the offending attack. In some circumstances it
may be impossible or inappropriate to attack the specific means used in an attack
(e.g., because the specific equipment and personnel used cannot be reliably
identified or located, or an attack on the specific means used would not be effective, or an effective attack on the specific means used might result in disproportionate collateral damage). Where the specific means cannot be effectively
attacked, any legitimate military target could be attacked, including intelligence
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and military leadership targets, as long as the purpose of the attack is to dissuade
the enemy from further attacks or to degrade the enemy's ability to undertake
them.
There has been some support for the proposition that a nation has an inherent
right to use force in self-defense against acts that do not constitute a classic armed
attack. This view is supported by the inclusion in the General Assembly's definition of aggression of acts that do not entail armed attacks by a nation's armed
forces, such as the unlawful extension ofthe presence ofvisiting forces, or allowing a nation's territory to be used by another state "for perpetrating an act ofaggression against a third State." (See pages A-8-A-ll above). U.S. practice also
support this position, as demonstrated in the 1986 bombing ofLioyan command
and leadership targets to persuade Libya to stop sponsoring terrorist attacks
against U.S. interests, and in the 1993 attack on the Iraqi military intelligence
headquarters to persuade Iraq to desist from assassination plots against former
President Bush. A contrary view was expressed in the International Court ofJustice's 1986 ruling in Nicaragua v. U.S. that the provision ofarms by Nicaragua to
the leftist rebels in El Salvador did not constitute an armed attack on El Salvador,
so it could not form the basis of a collective self-defense argument that would
justify armed attacks in response, such as laying ofmines in Nicaraguan waters or
certain attacks on Nicaraguan ports, oil installations and a naval base--acts that
were "imputable" to the United States. The Court also said it had insufficient
evidence to determine whether certain cross-border incursions by Nicaraguan
military forces into the territory ofHonduras and Costa Rica constituted armed
attacks. The extent to which Nicaragua's conduct would justify El Salvador and
its ally the United States in responding in ways that did not themselves constitute
an armed attack was not before the Court. The opinion ofthe court nevertheless
provides some support for the proposition that the provocation must constitute
an armed attack before it will justify an armed attackin self-defense. It seems safe
to say that the issue of whether traditional armed force may be used in self-defense in response to provocations that are not technically regarded as armed attacks is far from setded, and that the positions taken by states may be sharply
influenced by the nature of the events concerned, together with all attendant
policy and political considerations.
By logical implication, to the extent that a nation chooses to respond to a
computer network attack by mounting a similar computer network attack ofits
own, the issue of whether the initial provocation constituted an armed attack
may become a tautology. If the provocation is considered to be an armed attack,
the victim may be justified in launching its own armed attack in self-defense. If
the provocation is not considered to be an armed attack, a similar response will
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also presumably not be considered to be an armed attack. Accordingly, the question of the availability of the inherent right of self-defense in response to computer network attacks comes into sharpest focus when the victim of a computer
network attack considers acting in self-defense using traditional military means.
The issue may also arise if the response causes disproportionately serious effects
(e.g., if a state responded to a computer network attack that caused only minor
inconvenience with its own computer network attack that caused multiple
deaths and injuries). As in all cases when a nation considers acting in self-defense,
the nation considering such action will have to make its best judgment on how
world opinion, or perhaps a body such as the International Court ofJustice (IC])
or the UNSC, is likely to apply the doctrine ofself-defense to electronic attacks.
As ,vith many novel legal issues, we are likely to discover the answer only from
e:A-perience.
It seems beyond doubt that any unauthonzed intrusion into a nation's computer systems would justify that nation at least in taking self-help actions to expel
the intruder and to secure the system against reentry. An unauthorized electronic intrusion into another nation's computer systems may very well end up
being regarded as a: violation ofthe victim's sovereignty. It may even be regarded
as equivalent to a physical trespass into a nation's territory, but such issues have
yet to be addressed in the international community. Furthermore, the act of obtaining unauthorized access to a nation's computer system creates a vulnerability, since the intruder will have had access to the informatidn in the system and
he may have been able to corrupt data or degrade the operating system. Accordingly, the discovery that an intrusion has occurred may call into question the reliability of the data and the operating system and thus reduce its utility. If an
unauthorized computer intrusion can be reliably characterized as intentional
and it can be attributed to the agents of another nation, the victim nation will at
least have the right to protest, probably with some confidence of obtaining a
sympathetic hearing in the world community.

D. An "Active Defense" against Computer Network Attacks.
A persistent foreign intruder who gains repeated unauthorized entry into a
nation's computer systems by defeating a variety of security measures or who
gains entry into a number ofcomputer systems may demand a different response.
Such behavior may indicate both that there is a continuing danger and that coercive measures are necessary to stop the intruder's pattern of conduct. Similarly,
there may be a right to use force in self-defense against a single foreign electronic
attack in circumstances where significant damage is being done to the attacked
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system or the data stored in it, when the system is critical to national security or
to essential national infrastructures, or when the intruder's conduct or the context of the activity clearly manifests a malicious intent.
Ifit is capable ofdoing so, in such circumstances the victim nation may be justified in launching a computer network attack in response, intended to disable
the equipment being used by the intruder. Disabling one computer mayor may
not defeat a state-sponsored operation. It may, however, serve as a "shot across
the bow" warning of more serious consequences if the offending behavior continues. It is also an action unlikely to come to public attention unless one of the
two governments announces it, making it a potentially useful measure for conflict avoidance. Conducting a responsive computer network attack as a measure
of self-defense against foreign computer network attacks would have the major
advantage that it would minimize issues of proportionality, which would be
more likely to arise if traditional military force were used, such as firing a cruise
missile at the building from which a computer network attack is being conducted. Either response would likely be analyzed on the basis of the traditional
criteria of necessity and proportionality.
If it is impractical to focus an attack on the equipment used in the provocation, any legitimate military target may be attacked. The primary value of being
able to demonstrate a ne}""Us between the provocation and the response is to be
able to argue the likely therapeutic effect of the force used in self-defense. As a
practical matter, the next most attractive target after the equipment used in the
provocation may be the offending nation's communications systems, or its military or intelligence chain of command. The consequences of a large-scale campaign of computer network attacks might well justify a large-scale traditional
military response.
As stated above, the discussion up to this point has assumed we know who an
intruder is, and that we are confident in characterizing his intent. In practice, this
is seldom the case, at least in the early stages of responding to computer intrusions. The above legal analysis may change if the identity and location of an intruder is uncertain, or ifhis intent is unclear.
Identification of the originator ofan attack has often been a difficult problem,
especially when the intruder has used a number of intermediate relay points,
when he has used an "anonymous bulletin board" whose function is to strip
away all information about the origin ofmessages it relays, or when he has used a
device that generates false origin information. Progress has been made, however, in solving the technical problem ofidentifying the originator of computer
messages, and reliable identification of the computer that originated a message
may soon be routinely available. Attribution may also be provided by
486

Appendix
intelligence from other sources, or it might be reliably inferred from the relationship of the attack to other events.
Locating the computer used by the intruder does not entirely solve the attribution problem, however, since it may have been used by an unauthorized person, or by an authorized user for an unauthorized purpose. A parent may not
know that the family computer is being used for unlawful attacks on government computer systems. Universities, businesses, and other government agencies may be similarly unaware that their computer systeins are being misused.
The owner ofa computer system may have some responsibility to make sure it is
not being used for malicious purp.oses, but the extent ofsuch responsibility, and
the consequences offailing to meet it, have apparently not been addressed in any
U.S. or foreign statute or court decision. These considerations should make us
cautious in implementing any "active defense" system for government computer systems. Nevertheless, circumstances may arise in which the urgency of
protecting critical information systems from serious damage may warrant adoption of a properly designed "active defense."
Similarly, characterization ofan intruder's intentions may be difficult. Nevertheless, such factors as persistence; sophistication of methods used, targeting of
especially sensitive systems, and actual damage done may persuasively indicate
both the intruder's intentions and the dangers to the system in a manner that
would justify use ofan "active defense." As with attribution, there may be useful
intelligence on this issue from other sources, or it may be possible to reliably infer the intent ofthe intruder from the relationship ofthe attack to other events.
A determination that an intrusion originates in a foreign country would be
only a partial solution to the attribution problem, since the attack mayor may
not be state-sponsored. State-sponsored attacks may well generate the right of
self-defense. State sponsorship might be persuasively established by such factors
as signals or human intelligence, the location ofthe offending computer within a
state-controlled facility, or public statements by officials. In other circumstances,
state sponsorship may be convincingly inferred from such factors as the state of
relationships between the two countries, the prior involvement of the suspect
state in computer network attacks, the nature of the systems attacked, the nature
and sophistication of the methods and equipment used, the effects ofpast attacks,
and the damage which seems likely from future attacks.
Attacks th~t cannot be shown to be state-sponsored generally do not justify
acts ofself-defense in another nation's territory. States jealously guard their sovereign prerogatives, and they are intolerant of the exercise of military,
law-enforcement, and other "core sovereign powers" by other states within
their territory \vithout their consent. When individuals carry out malicious acts
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for private purposes against the interests of one state from within the territory of
a second state, the aggrieved state does not generally have the right to use force in
self-defense against either the second state itself or the offending individual.
Even if it were possible to conduct a precise computer network attack on the
equipment used by such individual actors, the state in which the effects of such
an attack were felt, ifit became aware of it, could well take the position that its
sovereignty and territorial integrity had been violated. The general e:l-..-pectation
is that a nation whose interests are damaged by the private conduct ofan individual who acts within the territory ofanother nation will notify the government of
that nation and request its cooperation in putting a stop to such conduct.
Only ifthe requested nation is unwilling or unable to prevent recurrence does
the doctrine ofself-defense permit the injured nation to act in self-defense inside
the territory of another nation. The U.S. cruise missile strikes against terrorists
camps in Afghanistan on 20 August 1998 provide a close analogy in which the
United States attacked camps belonging to a terrorist group located in the territory ofa state which had clearly stated its intention to continue to provide a refuge for the terrorists. At some point, providing safe refuge for those who
conduct attacks against another nation becomes complicity in those attacks. At a
minimum, the offended nation is authorized to attack its tormenters, the terrorists. As complicity shades into the kinds of active support and direction that are
commonly called "state sponsorship," military and leadership targets of the host
state may themselves become lawful targets for acts of self-defense.
Attacks on insurgents or on terrorists and other criminals using a neutral nation's territory as a refuge may also be justified when the neutral state is unable to
satisfy its obligations. During the Vietnam war, the United States attacked North
Vietnamese military supply lines and base camps in Cambodia after the Cambodian government took the position that it was unable to prevent North Vietnam
from making such use of its territory. This principle might justify using active
defense measures against a computer intruder located in a neutral nation if the
government of the neutral nation declared it had no way to locate the intruder
and make him stop, or ifits behavior made it clear that it could not or would not
act, or even if the circumstances did not allow time for diplomatic representations to be effective. As an analogy, it seems unlikely that a nation would complain very loudly if its neighbor nation returned fire against a terrorist sniper
firing from its territory.
In summary, the international law ofself-defense would not generally justify
acts of "active defense" across international boundaries unless the provocation
could be attributed to an agent of the nation concerned, or until the sanctuary
nation has been put on notice and given the opportunity to put a stop to such
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private conduct in its territory and has failed to do so, or the circumstances demonstrate that such a request would be futile. Nevertheless, in some circumstances
the National Command Authority (NCA) might decide to defend U.S. information systems by attacking a computer system overseas, and take the risk of
having to make an apology or pay compensation to the offended government.
Among the factors the NCA would probably consider would be the danger presented to U.S. national security from continuing attacks, whether immediate action is necessary, how much the sanctuary nation would be likely to object, and
how the rest of the world community would be likely to respond.
There need be less concern for the reaction of nations through whose territory or communications systems a destructive message may be routed. If only
the nation's public communications systems are involved, the transited nation
will nonnally not be aware of the routing such a message has taken. Even ifit becomes aware ofthe transit ofsuch a message and attributes it to the United States,
there would be no established principle ofinternational law that it could point to
as being violated. As discussed above, even during an international anned conflict international law does not require a neutral nation to restrict the use of its
public communications networks by belligerents. Nations generally consent to
the free use of their communications networks on a commercial or reciprocal
basis. Accordingly, use of a nation's communications networks as a conduit for
an electronic attack would not be a violation ofits sovereignty in the same way
that would be a flight through its airspace by a military aircraft.
A transited state would have somewhat more right to complain if the attacking state obtained unauthorized entry into its computer systems as part of the
communications path to the target computer. It would be even more offended if
malicious logic directed against a target computer had some hannful effect
against the transited state's own equipment, operating systems, or data. The possibility of such collateral damage would have to be carefully considered by the
state launching any such attack. If there were a high potential for such collateral
damage to transited systems, the weapon might even be considered to be an "indiscriminate" weapon incapable of being reliably directed against a legitimate
target.
There are at least two ways in which the availability ofimproved technology
may affect the active-defense equation. First, it might be argued that as a government acquires the ability to build better :firewalls and other security systems it
will be harder to argue that an active defense is "necessary." This argument
might be raised even if the target government has failed to install all possible
technological security measures on the system that is under attack. This demanding approach to "necessity" :finds little support in the practice of nations.
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The focus of self-defense analysis is on events as they unfold, and not as they
might have been ifdifferent budgeting and acquisition decisions had been made
sometime in the past. Ifsuch systems are in place, however, their apparent effectiveness should be taken into account in deciding whether active defense measures are necessary. This does not mean that a nation has no right ofself-defense
where a first attempted intrusion fails, or even when a series of intrusions fail. If
an attacker is permitted to continue mounting a campaign ofsuch attacks it may
learn by trial and error, it may employ other capabilities, or it may stumble onto a
point of vulnerability. Just as an infantry unit exercising the right of self-defense
may pursue a force that breaks off an attack and attempts to retreat until the attacker ceases to be a threat, decisions on taking measures of self-defense against
computer network attacks must take into account the extent to which an attacker continues to present a threat of continuing attacks.
Another possible implication of a defender's technological prowess may arise
when a nation has the capacity for graduated self-defense measures. Some
may argue that a nation having such capabilities must select a response that will
do minimal damage. This is a variant of the argument that a nation possessing
precision-guided munitions must always use them whenever there is a potential
for collateral damage. That position has garnered litde support among nations
and has been strongly rejected by the United States. There is broad recognition
that the risk of collateral damage is only one ofmany military considerations that
must be balanced by military authorities planning an attack. One obvious consideration is that a military force that goes into a protracted conflict with a policy
of always using precision-guided munitions whenever there is any potential for
collateral damage will soon exhaust its supply ofsuch munitions. Similarly, military authorities must be able to weigh all relevant military considerations in
choosing a response in self-defense against computer network attacks. These
considerations will include the probable effectiveness of the means at their disposal, the ability to assess their effects, and the "fragility" of electronic means of
attack (i.e., once they are used, an adversary may be able to devise defenses that
will render them ineffective in the future). In the process ofreasoning by analogy
to the law applicable to traditional weapons, it must always be kept in mind that
computer network attacks are likely to present implications that are quite different from the implications presented by attacks with traditional weapons. These
different implications may well yield different conclusions.
It may be possible to specify certain information systems that are vital to national security-both government systems and key civilian infrastructure systems. This process should serve both to give such systems high priority for
security measures and also to identify a class of systems any attack on which
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would immediately raise the issue of whether an active defense should be employed. This should not, of course, eliminate consideration of using an active
defense against attacks on systems not on such a "vital systems" list where the
circumstances justify such action. For example, a vigorous attack that threatens
to overwhelm an information system not on the "vital systems" list but that performs an important national security function could be a more valid occasion to
use active defense measures than would be a trivial and easily defeated attack on a
designated "vital system." A list of "vital systems" would serve primarily as an
alert mechanism that would bring about a prompt high-level evaluation of all
the circumstances.
In addition, it would be useful to create a process for determining when the
response to a computer intrusion should shift from the customary law enforcement and counter-intelligence modes to a national defense mode. Such a process
should include (1) a statement of general criteria to be applied; (2) identification
of officials or agencies that will be involved in making the decision; and (3) procedures to be followed.
There are ofcourse a variety of treaty obligations that will have to be considered before adopting an "active defense" against foreign computer network attacks, and these will be discussed below. There are also a variety ofdomestic legal
concerns that will have to be addressed, and these will be discussed in the companion assessment of domestic law issues in information operations.

E. Assessment.
It is far from clear the extent to which the world community will regard computer network attacks as "armed attacks" or "uses offorce," and how the doctrines ofself-defense and countermeasures will be applied to computer network
attacks. The outcome will probably depend more on the consequences of such
attacks than on their mechanisms. The most likely result is an acceptance that a
nation subjected to a state-sponsored computer network attack can lawfully respond in kind, and that in some circumstances it may be justified in using traditional military means in self-defense. Unless the nations decide to negotiate a
treaty addressing computer network attacks, which seems unlikely anytime in
the near future, intemationallaw in this area will develop through the actions of
nations and through the positions the nations adopt publicly as events unfold.
U.S. officials must be aware of the implications of their own actions and statements in this formative period.
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IV. SPACE LAW

A. Introduction.
International law regulating activities in outer space is important to the information operator because space segments are critical to so many important information systems. These systems perform such functions as communications relay,
imagery collection, missile warning, navigation, weather forecasting, and signals
intelligence. In fact, it can be said that at the current stage of space activity, the
exclusive functions of both military and civilian satellites are to gather and relay
information. In the conduct ofinformation operations, there will be strong imperatives to interfere with the space-based information systems belonging to an
adversary, and to defend one's own.
One approach to attacking space systems is by targeting their ground stations.
Another approach is to jam or "spoof' their communications links. Such actions
are subject to the normal international law principles governing other terrestrial
activity. Sometimes, however, it may be more effective to attack the satellite or
satellites that form the space segment of the system. .As we will see, activities in
space are subject both to general principles ofinternational law and to a number
of treaty obligations that apply specifically to space activities.

B. Space Law Treaties.
There is probably no other field of human endeavor that produced so much
international law in such a short period. Within twenty years after the first Sputnik launch in 1957, international diplomatic conferences produced four major
widely-accepted multilateral space law treaties. Taken together, these treaties
provide the foundations of existing space law.

• The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use Of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the Outer
Space Treaty, 1967)
• The Agreement on the Rescue ofAstronauts, Return ofAstronauts, and the Retllm
of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the Rescue and Return Agreement,
1968)
• The Convention on International Liability for Damages Caused by Space Objects
(the Liability Convention, 1972)
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• The Convention on the Registration
Registration Convention, 1975)

cif Objects Launched into

Outer Space (the

Note: There is another treaty called the Moon Agreement of1979 which the
United States has never signed and which has attracted only 9 parties, among
whom only France is active in space operations. In addition, several provisions
of the 1980 Environmental Modification Convention apply to space activity.
These agreements are not direcdy relevant to information operations, however,
and they will not be discussed further here.
The four major space treaties together establish the following principles that
are direcdy relevant to information operations. These principles have been so
,videly accepted that they are generally regarded as constituting binding customary international law, even for non-parties to these agreements.
• Space is free for exploration and use by all nations. It is not subject to national appropriation by claim ofsovereignty, use, occupation, or any other
means.
• Activities in space shall be conducted with due regard for the interests of
other states.
• States that launch space objects are liable for any damage they may do in
space, in the air, or on the surface ofthe Earth. Different standards ofliability are established for damage done to other items in space, for which a
"fault" standard applies, and damage done on the surface of the Earth and
to aircraft in flight, for which absolute liability applies.
• Space activities are subject to general principles of international law, including the UN Charter.
Several conclusions are apparent from these general principles. The first is
that the rules on the use offorce discussed in Section III of this paper apply fully
to activities in outer space. Among these are that nations are obliged not to use
force in their relations with each other unless they are acting in self-defense or
when authorized to do so by the UN Security Council. Once again, however, as
with other forms ofinformation operations, one has to consider what actions by
or against objects in space will be considered to be uses offorce. The world community would probably not hesitate to regard as a use offorce the destruction of
a satellite by a missile or a laser. It would probably react similarly if it could be
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proven that one nation took over control of another nation's satellite by electronic means and caused it to fire its retro rockets and fall out of orbit. In such a
case, the consequences will probably matter more than the mechanism used.
The reaction of the world community to lesser kinds ofinterference is hard to
predict. For example, ifone nation were able by electronic means to suspend the
operations of another nation's satellite for a brief period, after which it returned
to service undamaged, it seems likely that the world community would consider
such action as a breach of the launching nation's sovereign rights, but not as a use
of armed force.
One could argue, however, that this argument is unimportant because the
space treaties create a specific obligation not to interfere with the space activities
of other nations, and to pay reparations for any damages resulting from such interference. This argument appears to have considerable force, at least in peacetime. During an international armed conflict between the two nations
concerned, however, the law of armed conflict would apply unless it was
trumped by the principle of noninterference with space systems. Resolution of
this issue depends largely on whether the four space treaties will be considered to
apply during an armed conflict. None of them has any specific provision that indicates whether the parties intended that the agreement apply in wartime.
There appears to be a strong argument that the principle of noninterference
established by these agreements is inconsistent with a state of hostilities, at least
where the systems concerned are ofsuch high military value that there is a strong
military imperative for the adversary to be free to interfere with them, even to
the extent ofdestroying the satellites in the system. As indicated in the discussion
of treaty law in the introduction to this paper, the outcome of this debate may
depend on the circumstances in which it first arises in practice. Nevertheless, it
seems most likely that these agreements will be considered to be suspended between the belligerents for the duration of any armed conflict, as least to the extent necessary for the conduct of the conflict.
If the principle of noninterference is regarded as suspended for the period of
the conflict, it also seems likely that the liability provisions in these agreements
would also be suspended, at least between the parties. This would not, however,
excuse the belligerents from liability to neutral nations if their actions caused
damage to their citizens or property

c. Specific Prohibitions of Military Activities in Space.
There is a popular notion that military activities in space are prohibited-that
space is a place a little closer to heaven into which the nations have agreed not to
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introduce weapons and human conflict. There is a germ of truth in this notion,
supported by high flights of rhetoric in international fora, but the existing treaty
restrictions on military operations in space are in fact very limited. These restrictions are included in both the space treaties listed above and in various arms control agreements.
The Outer Space Treaty provides that the parties will not "place in orbit
around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of
weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies [i.e., the
moon, planets, and asteroids], or station such weapons in outer space in any
other manner." The treaty permits placing in orbit weapons other than nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Also, the treaty contains no
prohibition against nuclear weapons transiting outer space, as long as they do not
enter into an earth orbit and they do not explode in outer space.
The Outer Space Treaty also prohibits the establishment ofmilitary bases, the
testing ofweapons, and the conduct ofmilitary maneuvers on the moon or other
celestial bodies. It permits these activities in orbit around the Earth, and in other
places in outer space. Similarly, there is no prohibition against establishing military space stations or operating other satellites with offensive or defensive
capabilities.
The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water (the Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963) prohibits all nuclear explosions
in outer space. Accordingly, a party to this agreement may not lawfully explode
a nuclear device in outer space in order to disable an adversary's satellites by
means of the electro-magnetic pulse generated by a nuclear explosion, or by its
other effects. A nation operating its own satellite systems is unlikely to take such
an action in any event, since its own satellites would be subject to the same effects as those belonging to its adversary.
The Treaty on tlte Limitation ofAnti-Ballistic Missile Systems (the ABM Treaty,
1972) provides that no party may" develop, test or deploy space-based ABM systems or components."
Under a 1997 theater missile defense (TMD) agreement not yet ratified by
the Senate, the United States and Russia have agreed not to place in space theater
missile defense interceptor missiles "or space-based components based on other
physical principles, whether or not part ofa system, that are capable ofsubstituting for such interceptor missiles."
A number of arms control agreements provide that no party will interfere
with the others' "national technical means of verification." Translated, this
means no interference \vith the orbiting imaging systems used to monitor the
strategic arms of another party.
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Read together, these agreements pennit the development, testing, and deployment ofanti-satellite and satellite-defense systems unless they involve either
the stationing or testing of nuclear devices in outer space or the orbiting of systems that also have ABM or ATM capabilities. Their use is subject only to (1) the
general principles ofinternational law relating to the use offorce; (2) the principle of non-interference with the space systems of other nations in peacetime,
subject to the right to use force in self-defense and when authorized by the UN
Security Council; (3) the law ofwar during international armed conflicts; and (4)
obligations under relevant arms-control agreements not to interfere ,vith other
parties' national technical means ofverification. This leaves a very broad range of
pennissible "space-control" systems and operations.
In a non-nuclear conflict, the parties might very well detennine that the
treaty prohibitions against placing nuclear weapons in orbit, against e}.1'loding
nuclear devices in outer space, and against placing ABM components and ATM
interceptors in orbit remain consistent with a state of limited armed conflict.
Those obligations may well serve to avoid escalation of the conflict to the nuclear leveL The parties' conclusions as to the obligation not to interfere ,vith
other parties' national technical means of verification will probably depend to a
great extent on the circumstances of the conflict.
D. Domestic Law and Policy.
A federal statute, 18 USC 1367, makes it a felony to intentionally or maliciously interfere with a communications or weather satellite, or to obstruct or
hinder any satellite transmission. The application ofthis statute to national security information operations is discussed in the companion assessment of domestic legal issues.
U.S. domestic policy on developing space control capabilities has been inconsistent at best. By the early 1980s the U.S. Air Force had developed an
anti-satellite missile with an explosive warhead that was carried aloft by an F-15
fighter and launched at high altitude. A test of this system was conducted in 1985
against a U.S. satellite whose useful life had e}.1'ired. Congress soon thereafter
decreed that no appropriated funds were to be used to test any weapon against an
object in orbit. In 1987 the USAF program was tenninated. At the time, it appeared that members of Congress voting for the ban had done so for a variety of
reasons, among which were: (1) support for the broad principle that space should
be free from human conflict; (2) dismay that the first test had generated 285
pieces of trackable space debris; (3) concern that further testing of an
anti-satellite capability might interfere with continuing strategic arms control
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negotiations; and (4) concern that the United States should not press ahead with
testing an anti-satellite system when the nation had yet to decide where its own
long-term interests lie. Concerning this last point, it was obvious that there is a
military interest in being able to defend your own space systems and having the
ability to interfere ,vith your adversary's, but there was also a contrary consideration that the long-term interests of the United States-as the nation that depends most heavily on space systems-may be better served by promoting the
development of a regime ofinternationallaw that prohibits any interference by
one nation with the space systems of another, and inhibits the acquisition of the
capability to do so. That fundamental debate has yet to be pursued to a definitive
conclusion.
Later, when public attention was drawn to the possible use of lasers as
anti-satellite weapons, Congress prohibited the use ofappropriated funds to illuminate any object in orbit with a laser. This restriction was removed in 1995. In
October 1997 the U.S. Army conducted a test in which it illuminated an Air
Force satellite nearing the end of its useful life with the MIRACL laser, located
at White Sands, New Mexico. Despite public announcements that the purpose
of the experiment was purely defensive in nature--to observe the effects of the
laser on the satellite's optical sensors in order to better protect U.S. satellites from
deliberate or accidental laser illumination-a public furor ensued. Shortly thereafter President Clinton exercised his short-lived item veto authority to delete
funds from the FY 98 DoD Authorization Act for development of an Army Kinetic Energy Anti-Satellite Missile and two other projects that he considered to
be related to space control. Congress approved additional funds for space control
projects in the FY 1999 DoD Authorization Act and urged expenditure of the
FY 98 funds that were restored after the Supreme Court ruled that the item veto
was unconstitutional.
At this point, it seems fair to say that the United States has not arrived at a consensus on the fundamental policy issues concerning space control. It seems likely
for the near future that the development ofsuch systems will continue, with renewed controversy to be expected as soon as a decision is imminent on the deployment, or even advanced testing, of an operational system. .

E. International Efforts to Control "Weaponization of Space".
Over the last decade there has been strong support in the UN General Assembly for negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) of a draft treaty
banning weapons in space. The most recent action by the General Assembly was
its adoption on 4 December 1998 by a vote of 165-0-4 of a resolution entided
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"Prevention ofan arms race in outer space." This resolution calls for reestablishment by the CD of an Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race
in Outer Space that existed in prior years. Canada and Egypt are actively promoting consideration of a "no weapons in space" treaty in the CD, but so far
they have garnered litde active support among the other CD members. Both
Russia and China have also announced their support for negotiations to ban
"weaponization of space," but neither has advanced a specific proposal with
much vigor. In summary, there appears to be widespread lukewarm support for
the general idea of a treaty banning an "arms race in space," but the subject enjoys a low priority at the moment and no draft treaty has garnered significant
support. This may all change ifand when a nation or nations are known to have
deployed operational space control systems, or are on the verge of doing so.
Chinese and Russian support for a ban on "weaponization ofspace" is seen in
some quarters as ironic, since China is reported to be developing a ground-based
anti-satellite laser system and Russia is the only nation known to have once had
an operational anti-satellite missile. There have been a number of reports that
the Soviet Union developed a "co-orbital ASAT" that was launched into orbit,
where it maneuvered close enough to a target satellite to destroy the target by
exploding. Reportedly, the Soviet system was tested against objects in space 20
times and became operational in 1978. Russia consistendy denied that it had
tested or deployed such a system until September 1997, when press reports indicate that President Yeltsin said in a letter to President Clinton that Russia at one
time possessed an anti-satellite capability, but that it had since "renounced" it.
F. Assessment.
There is no legal prohibition against developing and using space control
weapons, whether they would be employed in orbit, from an aircraft in flight, or
from the Earth's surface. The primary prohibition is against weapons that entail
the placing of nuclear weapons in orbit or that would employ a nuclear eX1Jlosion in outer space. The use ofspace control systems in peacetime would be subject to both the general principles of international law and to treaty obligations
not to interfere with other nations' space systems and national technical means of
verification. These obligations would probably be suspended during an international armed conflict, during which the parties' conduct would be governed primarily by the law of war. U.S. domestic policy on space control, however, is at
best unsetded.
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v. COMMUNICATIONS LAW
A. International Communications Law.
International communications law consists primarily of a number of bilateral
and multilateral communications treaties. The most significant ofthese treaties is
the International Telecommunications Convention of 1982 (lTC), which has over
140 parties and which became effective for the United States in 1986. This
agreement, often referred to as the Nairobi Convention, is the latest in a series of
widely adhered to multilateral telecommunications conventions signed in this
century, which were preceded by multilateral agreements in the late 1800s providing protection for submarine cables. The current series of agreements establishes the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which has the status
of a specialized agency of the United Nations, and they invest the ITU with the
authority to formulate telegraph and telephone regulations which become binding legal obligations upon formal acceptance by ITU member nations. These
agreements also establish mutual legal obligations among the parties, several of
which are directly relevant to information operations.
Perhaps the most significant of these obligations is in Article 35, which provides that ali radio "stations, whatever their purpose, must be established and operated in such a manner as not to cause harmful interference to the radio services
or communications of other Members or of recognized private operating agencies, which carry on radio service, and which operate in accordance with the
provisions ofthe Radio Regulations." "Harmful interference" is defined in Annex 2 to the Convention as "interference which endangers the functioning of a
radio navigation service or of other safety services or seriously degrades, obstructs or repeatedly interrupts a radio communication service operating in accordance ,vith the Radio Regulations." One of the clearest violations of this
provision would be the jamming or "spoofing" of a radio navigation service.
Without speculating on all the possible permutations of the application of this
provision to the broad range of information operations, suffice it to say that this
provision on its face would appear to restrict many such operations that involve
the use of radio broadcasting.
On the other hand, Article 38 of the ITC provides a specific exemption for
military transmissions: "Members retain their entire freedom with regard to
military radio installations of their army, naval and air forces." In July 1994,
when the United States was considering broadcasting messages to the Haitian
people from U.S. military aircraft in international airspace urging them not to set
out to sea in hazardous vessels, the Office ofLegal Counsel in the Department of
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Justice relied on the military exemption in Article 38 as one of several bases for
determining that the ITC does not prohibit such activity. Article 38 goes on to
say, "Nevertheless, these installations must, so far as possible, observe ... the
measures to be taken to prevent harmful interference, and the provisions of the
Administrative Regulations concerning the types of emission and the frequencies to be used, according to the nature of the service performed by such installations." While this provision indicates that military installations do not have carte
blanche to interfere with civilian communications, the phrase "so far as possible," read together with the specific exemption for military radio installations,
provides considerable room to maneuver for information operations conducted
by military forces.
The ITC also provides specific authority for its member nations to interfere
with international telecommunications in certain circumstances:
• Article 19 allows members to "stop the transmission of any private telegram which may appear dangerous to the security of the State or contrary
to their laws, to public order or to decency, provided that they immediately notify the office of origin of the stoppage ofany such telegram or part
thereof, except when such notification may appear dangerous to the security of the State."
• Article 19 also permits members to "cut off any other private telecommunications which may appear dangerous to the security of the State or contrary to its laws, to public order or to decency."
• Article 20 reserves the right ofmembers "to suspend the international telecommunication service for an indefinite time, either generally or only for
certain relations and/or certain kinds of correspondence, outgoing, incoming or in transit, provided that it immediately notifies such action to
each of the other Members through the medium of the SecretaryGeneral."
Finally, it seems clear that the lTC's provisions apply primarily in peacetime.
The treaty does not specifically state how-if at all-it will apply during an
armed conflict. Nevertheless, there is ample precedent in which nations have
demonstrated conclusively that they regard the provisions of international communications conventions as being suspended between belligerents engaged
in armed conflicts. Prior to the First World War, for example, all the major European nations were parties to the 1884 Convention for Protection of Submarine
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Cables. The first day ofthe war, the British Navy pulled up and cut the five major
submarine cables serving Germany. Throughout all the wars of this century,
communications facilities of all sorts have been regarded as priority military targets. Since some of the parties to the ITC and other multilateral communications conventions are likely to be neutrals in armed conflicts between other
nations, the result may become somewhat complicated. Most ITC obligations
will be considered to be suspended among the belligerents, but they will remain
in effect between each belligerent and the neutral parties to the agreement, as
well as among the neutral parties.
Note: The issue of the extent to which a neutral nation or an international
communications consortium may continue to provide communications services
to a belligerent is discussed in the law of war section of this paper.
The United States has negotiated bilateral communications only selectively,
primarily because the ITC and the ITU provide a framework for handling most
international communications issues. As one might expect, the need for bilateral
communications agreements has arisen for the United States primarily with
Canada and Mexico, because of the potential for interference in broadcast communications across our common borders. A number of bilateral communications agreements have also been negotiated between the United States and
nations where U.S. military forces are stationed. There is a potential for such bilateral agreements to either restrict or facilitate information operations by U.S.
military f~rces. The agreements concerned should be consulted when such an issue arises.

B. Domestic Communications Law.
The ITC and its predecessors obligate each Member nation to suppress acts by
individuals or groups within its territory that interfere with the communications
of other members. In partial satisfaction of this obligation, in 1934 Congress enacted 47 USC 502, which provides, "Any person who willfully and knowingly
violates any rule, regulation, restriction, or condition ... made or imposed by
any international radio or wire communications treaty or convention, or regulations annexed thereto, to which the United States is or may hereafter become a
party, shall, in addition to any other penalties provided by law, be punished,
upon conviction thereof, by a fine of not more than $500 for each and every day
during which such offense occurs." In October 1993, when the United States
was considering broadcasting radio messages to the people of Haiti supporting
the return of democracy in that nation, the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department ofJustice concluded in a written opinion that 47 USC 502 would not
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apply to the actions of u.s. military members acting on behalf of the President
pursuant to the President's foreign affairs and Commander-in-Chiefauthority.

c. Assessment.
International communications law contains no direct and specific prohibition against the conduct of information operations by military forces, even in
peacetime. The established practice ofnations provides p~rsuasive evidence that
telecommunications treaties are regarded as suspended among belligerents during international armed conflicts. Domestic communications laws do not prohibit properly authorized military information operations. Accordingly, neither
international nor domestic communications law appears to present a significant
barrier to information operations by u.s. military forces.
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VI. IMPLICATIONS OF OTHER TREATIES
The State Department's most recent published list of international agreements to which the United States is a party, TREATIES IN FORCE, January 1,
1998, is 495 pages long. The United States is a party to literally thousands ofmultilateral and bilateral international agreements. From their sheer numbers, one
would think it inescapable that lurking somewhere in those agreements are provisions that '\vill affect particular information operations activities. This section
attempts only to highlight certain kinds of "typical" agreements that are likely to
contain obligations relevant to the conduct of information operations.

A. Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements.
Mutual legal assistance agreements (sometimes called judicial assistance
agreements) obligate each party to gather and provide evidence located in its territory concerning litigation or criminal prosecutions that occur within the jurisdiction of another party requesting such assistance. The United States is a party
to several dozen mutual legal assistance agreements. Some of these agreements
apply only to the management of particular litigation or to certain types of offenses such as drug trafficking and money laundering. Only a few mutual legal
assistance agreements apply broadly to all law enforcement investigations and
prosecutions. Such an agreement may supply the only domestic legal authority
for the assisting party to investigate offenses that did not occur within its jurisdiction, and it also establishes procedures that expedite the requested assistance. To
be effective in helping to suppress computer crimes and other high-tech offenses, mutual legal assistance agreements must either expressly cover such offenses or they must apply broadly to all crimes.

B. Extradition Agreements.
Extradition agreements obligate the parties in certain circumstances to deliver
persons accused of crime to the other party for criminal prosecution. The
United States is a party to more than a hundred bilateral extradition treaties, as
well as to a 1933 Convention on Extradition to which thirteen nations in the
Americas are parties. If no extradition treaty is in effect, a national government
often '\vill have neither an international obligation nor the domestic authority to
deliver custody of an individual to another nation for the purpose of prosecution. It is important that the list of offenses covered by such agreements include
computer intrusions and other high-tech crimes. In addition, the effectiveness
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of extradition treaties is often frustrated by provisions providing that the requested nation will not extradite its own citizens, or that it will not extradite persons who commit crimes for political reasons.
NOTE: The Department ofJustice has undertaken a major initiative ,vith
the "G8" countries (the other seven being the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Italy, Canada, France, and Russia) to modernize the domestic criminal law
of each nation to adequately provide for the investigation and prosecution of
computer intrusions and other high-tech crimes, and to put into place any
needed improvements to international agreements providing for mutual legal
assistance and extradition. In December 1997 the Attorney General hosted a
meeting of the G8 Justice and Interior Ministers to discuss these issues, and a
number of follow-up working group meetings have been held since that time.
The United States has also participated in a project undertaken by the Council of
Europe to draft an international convention on "cyber-crime." Recently the
United States undertook similar efforts in the Organization of American States
and at the United Nations.

C. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Many provisions ofthis treaty, which is before the Senate for advice and consent, are considered to express customary international law. Some of the provisions discussed here are among them, and are therefore considered to be binding
on all nations whether or not they are parties to the Convention. Others constitute new obligations. One principle widely accepted as existing customary internationallaw is the obligation in Article 19 for a vessel exercising the right of
innocent passage through a nation's territorial sea not to engage in activities
"prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal State." The prejudicial activities listed in Article 19 include:
• "any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence ofthe coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the
United Nations
• any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or
security of the coastal State
• any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the
coastal State
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• any act aimed at interfering with any systems of conununication or any
other facilities or installations of the coastal State"
Once UNCLOS is in general effect, these restrictions on activities aboard
vessels in a coastal state's territorial sea will be ofrelatively minor importance because UNCLOS limits the width of the territorial sea a nation can claim to
twelve nautical miles. At present, a number of nations claim territorial seas as
,vide as 200 miles. The twelve-mile limitation on the width of the territorial sea,
together with other important guarantees UNCLOS establishes for the free operation ofmilitary aircraft and vessels, have led DoD to strongly support ratification ofUNCLOS.
Article 109 ofUNCLOS provides that all "States shall co-operate in the
suppression of unauthorized broadcasting from the high seas" and defines
unauthorized broadcasting, for the purposes of the Convention, as "the transmission of sound radio or television broadcasts from a ship or installation on the
high seas intended for reception by the general public contrary to international
regulations." The international regulations referred to consist primarily of the
provisions of the Nairobi Convention and the ITU's Radio Regulations discussed in section V of this paper. This provision, which is generally regarded as
establishing new law, was designed to deal with "pirate radio" broadcasting from
vessels and platforms on the high seas, which became a significant problem for a
number of countries in the 1960s. These broadcasts were primarily conunercial
in nature; by operating from the high seas they escaped the coastal state's regulation and taxation. Article 109 confers jurisdiction to prosecute persons engaged in pirate radio broadcasts upon the state whose flag the ship flies, the state
where a broadcasting installation is registered, the state of which the broadcasting person is a citizen, any state where the transmissions can be received, and any
state where authorized radio conununication is suffering interference. Article
109 also provides that any state havingjurisdiction to prosecute may "arrest any
person or ship engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and seize the broadcasting
apparatus."
Article 113 requires parties to adopt domestic criminal legislation punishing
willful or culpably negligent damage to submarine cables belonging to other
parties by ships or persons under their jurisdiction.
These UNCLOS provisions have the potential to affect only a narrow category ofinformation operations, but they will have to be considered when decisions are made concerning those operations to which they do apply, at least in
peacetime. UNCLOS does not e:ll..-pressly address how it will apply during an international armed conflict. In accordance with the general principles discussed
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in the introduction to this paper, provisions determined to be incompatible ,vith
a state of armed conflict will be regarded as suspended among the belligerents.
The established practice of nations leaves no doubt that Article 19's regime governing innocent passage through the territorial sea will be suspended between
belligerents. The same can be said with a high degree of confidence concerning
Article 113's protections for submarine cables. Article 109's provisions for the
suppression of unauthorized radio broadcasting from the high seas are relatively
new, with litde established practice. Analytically, there would seem to be litde
reason to suspend its application to commercial broadcasters during an armed
conflict, but it would almost certainly not apply to broadcasts from the high seas
conducted by a belligerent for military or diplomatic purposes.

D. Treaties on Civil Aviation.
The United States is a party to a number oftreaties concerning civil aviation,
the most significant of which is the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation. This treaty, which has more than 180 parties, is often referred to as the Chicago Convention. It establishes the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) and provides the basic legal framework for international civil aviation.
The Convention does not direcdy apply to state aircraft, except for the obligation stated in Article 3 (d): "The contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, that they will have due regard for the safety of
navigation of civil aircraft." This concern for safe navigation by civil aircraft is
also reflected in Article 28, which provides that each party will provide navigation and communications services as agreed upon through ICAO procedures,
and in Article 37, which provides that the parties will comply ,vith "international standards and recommended practices and procedures" on a variety of
subjects including communications systems and air navigation aids. Over the
years the ICAO Council has developed and adopted 18 technical Annexes to the
Chicago Convention. Annex 10, Aeronautical Telecommunications, contains
agreed provisions on aeronautical communications, navigation and surveillance.
While military aircraft are not direcdy bound by these provisions, their obligation of "due regard" for the safety of civil aircraft generally includes an obligation not to interfere with these systems.
The United States is currendy engaged in negotiations in ICAO concerning
the role to be played by the Global Positioning System in future navigation systems for international civil aviation. In particular, an accommodation must be
reached between ICAO's interest in ensuring that navigation services essential
to the safety of international civil aviation are not interrupted during an armed
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conflict, and the military imperative for the United States to be able to deny the
use ofGPS to a military adversary. Similar issues are certain to arise in the future
in which information operations activities may create implications for the safety
of international civil aviation.
The Chicago Convention is rare among multilateral treaties in that it has a
specific provision concerning its application during armed conflict. Article 89
provides, "In case of war, the provisions of this Convention shall not affect the
freedom of action of any of the contracting States affected, whether as
belligerents or as neutrals. The same principle shall apply in the case of any contracting State which declares a state ofnational emergency and notifies the fact to
the Council." Upon reflection, however, this provision is unlikely be applied as
broadly as its language indicates. It seems clear that many provisions of the Convention are inconsistent with a state of armed conflict. The most obvious is the
principle that aircraft not engaged in scheduled airline service have the right to
free passage into or through the airspace of other parties. Other provisions do
not appear to be incompatible with a state of armed conflict among some of the
parties. For example, the existence of a state of armed conflict among certain
parties should not be regarded as suspending the belligerents' obligation to carry
out their combatant activities with due regard for the safety ofcivil aviation. Accordingly, Article 89 does not provide much help in deciding what provisions of
the Convention will remain applicable during an armed conflict, and resort will
still be required to the general principle that only those obligations that are incompatible ,vith a state ofarmed conflict will be suspended, and only among the
belligerents.

E. Treaties on Diplomatic Relations.
The United States is a party to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a widely adhered to treaty establishing obligations among its parties concerning the treatment of diplomatic personnel and premises. Among the
protections afforded a party's diplomatic mission in the territory ofanother state
are the right to inviolability of the premises of the mission (Article' 2); its "archives and documents" (Article 24); the private residences, papers, correspondence, and property of diplomatic agents (Article 30); and diplomatic
communications (Article 27). The treaty further provides that the mission may
communicate with its government and other missions and consulates ofits government by "all appropriate means, including diplomatic couriers and messages
in code or cipher. However, the mission may install and use a wireless transmitter only with the consent ofthe receiving State." Conversely, the treaty imposes
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certain duties on diplomatic missions. Article 41 provides that personnel of the
mission must respect the laws and regulations of the receiving state, that they
must not interfere in the receiving state's internal affairs, and that the "premises
of the mission must not be used in any manner incompatible ,vith the functions
of the mission as laid down in the present Convention or by other rules of general international law or by any special agreements in force between the sending
and the receiving State." Article 45 provides that the duties of the receiving state
continue in force even in the case of armed conflict between the parties, or if
diplomatic relations are broken offbetween them, even though the staff of the
mission is recalled. Planning for any information operations activity that involves diplomatic premises, persons, archives, documents, or communications,
either as an instrument or as a target of the operation, must take into account
these international legal obligations.
F. Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation.
The United States is a party to a large number of bilateral agreements ,vith
other nations providing reciprocal arrangements for expedited tourism, trade,
and transportation between the parties. These agreements have various titles,
and their provisions differ somewhat. Most such agreements do not contain specific provisions on telecommunications, and they constitute perhaps the archetype of agreements that are likely to be regarded as suspended during an armed
conflict because their provisions expediting free travel and trade between the
parties are incompatible with hostilities between them. Nevertheless, planning
for information operations, especially in peacetime, should include a review of
all significant international agreements between the United States and any other
nation that may be affected.
G. Status of Forces and Stationing Agreements.
When the military forces of one nation are present in the territory of another
nation with its consent, it is customary for the nations involved to execute written agreements establishing the rights and obligations of the parties concerning
the visiting forces. "Stationing agreements" establish the consent of the host nation to the presence offoreign troops; set agreed limits on their numbers, equipment, and activities; and identify facilities for their use. These topics may also be
dealt with in a "defense cooperation agreement" or some other agreement providing for the overall defense relationship between the parties. It is also common
for the parties to execute a "status of forces" agreement (SOFA) that addresses
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the allocation of various kinds oflegal jurisdiction over the visiting forces. The
best known of these agreements is the 1951 Agreement Between the Parties to the
North Atlalltic Treaty Regardillg the Status of Their Forces (NATO SOFA). As of the
end of1998 the United States was a party to 103 SOFAs, most of which follow
the general pattern of the NATO SO FA. SOFAs are necessary because of an
overlap oflegal jurisdiction exercised by the sending and receiving states. The
receiving state has jurisdiction over persons and activities in its territory, while
the sending state has both the right and the duty to exercise control over its
armed forces, which is clearly a core sovereign function.
Since the full concurrent exercise of the normal jurisdiction of the sending
and receiving states is impractical, status of forces agreements allocate criminal
and civil court jurisdiction between the sending and receiving states, and also exempt the visiting force and its members from certain taxes, customs fees and procedures, immigration formalities, and most host nation licensing and inspection
requirements. Typically, an administrative claims procedure is established for
personal injuries and property damage caused by the visiting force. Another
common provision requires that the visiting force and its members "respect" the
host nation's laws. (This requirement will be discussed in detail in the next section ofthis paper). The NATO SOFA is implemented in most NATO countries
by separate, more detailed, bilateral supplementary agreements, and by numerous other bilateral agreements on specific subjects including communications.
These agreements contain provisions that must be taken into account if U.S.
military forces intend to engage in information operations activities while present in the territory of the receiving state.
• For example, many such agreements require that the United States notify the
host nation of any significant change in the capabilities or uses of installations
made available for the use of U.S. military forces. lfU.S. authorities intend to
conduct information operations activities from such installations, a determination must be made as to whether the relevant agreements require notifYing the
host nation, and perhaps even requesting its consent.
• Stationing agreements often provide that the visiting U.S. forces may install
and use various communications equipment, but they often provide as well that
such equipment must not interfere with host nation communications systems
and that it must be used in accordance with host nation laws and regulations. If
this equipment is to be used for information operations activities, it must be determined whether the contemplated activities are consistent with these
obligations.
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• Many stationing agreements authorize or even obligate the visiting force to
use the receiving state's military and civilian communications systems. Commonly, there are obligations that any u.s. use of host nation communications
systems must not cause interference and that such use must be in accordance
with host nation laws and regulations. The potential for information operations
to cause interference with the host nation's communications system and the possible application of host nation laws and regulations must be carefully considered, along with the fact that the conduct of offensive information operations
through host nation communications systems may subject them to possible
countermeasures and acts of self-defense in peacetime, and may make them legitimate military targets during an armed conflict.
Finally, ifa host nation discovers that its territory and facilities have been used
without its knowledge as a base for U.S. information operations of a nature that
may tend to involve it against its will in a conflict or dispute, U.S. diplomatic and
military relationships with the host nation are likely to suffer. The host nation
could well take the view that in principle there is little difference between using
an ally's territory to launch air strikes and using it to launch computer network
attacks or other information operations activities. As a practical matter, computer network attacks are much more difficult to identify, trace, and attribute.
However, it will not always be impossible to do so, particularly when information on such attacks is available from intelligence sources. Accordingly, decisions concerning whether to conduct information operations from the territory
of an ally, and especially whether to do so without the host nation's knowledge
and consent, must be made at senior policy levels.

H. U.S.,Soviet Dangerous Military Activities Agreement.
During the Cold War there were a number of incidents in which U.S. and
Soviet forces followed each other closely in international waters and airspace, especially during military exercises, and sometimes physically interfered ,vith each
other's operations. Lest these incidents inadvertently escalate into an armed confrontation, onJune 11, 1988 the Chairman of the Joint ChiefS of Staff and the
Soviet Chief of General Staff issued a joint statement in which they declared
their intent to avoid dangerous military activities in the vicinity of each other,
and onJuly 11, 1988 the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Agreement on the Prevention ofDangerous Military Activities. In Section 1 (d) of Article II
of that agreement, the parties agreed that, when operating in proximity to personnel and equipment of the armed forces of the other party during peacetime,
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they will not interfere "with command and control networks in a manner which
could cause harm to personnel or damage to equipment of the armed forces of
the other Party." Article I, Section 9 of the agreement defines "interference
with command and control networks" as "actions that hamper, interrupt or
limit the operation of the signals and information transmission means and systems providing for the control of personnel and equipment of the armed forces
of a Party." The United States has recognized the Russian Federation as a successor state to the Soviet Union for purposes of this agreement. The question of
succession under this agreement by other nations that were part of the Soviet
Union has not been authoritatively addressed. In the rather narrow circumstances in which this agreement applies, it remains a binding intemationallegal
obligation.
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vn. FOREIGN DOMESTIC LAWS
A. Introduction.
Laws enacted by other nations may have important implications for information operations activities conducted by U.S. military forces. U.S. criminal statutes addressing computer-related offenses, space activities, communications,
and the protection ofclassified information all raise important issues for information operations. Similarly, foreign laws affecting U.S. information operations
activities will most likely also consist of criminal statutes.
The sophistication of foreign domestic law on high-tech activities varies
enormously, and it will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. The more
technologically advanced countries tend to be more aware of the dangers created by computer hackers and other high-tech criminals, so they typically take
the lead in putting legislation into place to criminalize such behavior. It is no accident that the Justice Department's international program to promote appropriate changes to mutual legal assistance treaties and other nations' domestic
laws, which was discussed in Section VI of this paper, concentrated first on the
G8 countries and the Council ofEurope. There are other important variables at
work besides technological advancement, however, including each nation's
public opinion and policy positions concerning high-tech offenses, especially
computer hacking. There are persons in every country, including the United
States, who regard hackers as essentially hannless pranksters. There is a
well-established minority view that the Internet and all the computer systems
connected to it should be free game, and that defeating attempts to gain unrestricted access to these resources or imposing regulations on personal conduct on
the Internet are repressive violations ofthe hackers' civil liberties. The argument
is even advanced that hackers provide valuable assistance to the operators of the
computer systems they attack, by revealing vulnerabilities that otherwise might
have been exploited by sinister persons with malicious motives. On the international scene, there is the additional factor that many individuals love to see one of
their fellow citizens succeed in pulling the tail of richer and more powerful nations, especially the United States.
As a result, the state ofdomestic laws dealing with high-tech misconduct varies enormously from country to country. This has important implications for
U.S. information operations for two basic reasons: (1) The state ofa nation's domestic criminal law directly impacts the assistance that the nation's public officials can provide in suppressing certain behavior by persons operating in its
territory; and (2) The state of a nation's domestic criminal law may have a
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significant effect on U.S. infonnation operations conducted in the nation's territory or involving communications routed through the nation's communications
systems.

B. Cooperation in Investigations and Prosecutions.
It should be readily apparent that law enforcement officials cannot prosecute
an individual for conduct that is not defined as a crime in the applicable criminal
law. It may be less obvious, but equally important, that in most constitutional
governments law enforcement officials may not use their authority to conduct
criminal investigations unless the alleged conduct constitutes a crime. Ifa hacker
in Country X uses the Internet to gain access to a DoD computer in the Pentagon, copies sensitive data, deletes or corrupts data, and installs malicious logic,
the law enforcement officials of Country X may be able to assist in investigating
that conduct and may be able to extradite the offender to the United States only
if one or more of the hacker's actions constitute a crime under that nation's law.
Even where such legislation exists, the legal system may still not be able to provide either extradition or meaningful criminal punishment, as occurred in the
case ofa young Israeli hacker given a suspended sentence by an Israeli court after
he participated in a series of unlawful intrusions into DoD computer systems in
early 1998.
The domestic laws ofsome nations may also permit the use of devices specifically designed to frustrate attempts to trace Internet communications to their
source. Since geography is essentially irrelevant to communications on the
Internet, devices such as anonymous remailers, which strip off all infonnation
about the originator ofa message, make it possible for a hacker located anywhere
-even in the United States or other country-to avoid identification by routing his or her message through the anonymous remailer. In this way, weaknesses
in the domestic law of one state may provide impunity to hackers everywhere.
The weakest link therefore threatens law enforcement even in countries with
robust and sophisticated laws. Accordingly, the imperative to bring domestic
laws in every nation up to a reasonable standard should be readily apparent.

C. Effect of Foreign Domestic Law on Actions of
Operators.

u.s.

Information

Ifa CINC or aJTF commander decides to order execution ofa certain information operations activity by forces under his or her command who are deployed in a foreign country, the commander may have to consider whether or
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not such activity is prohibited under local law. The answer may be important at
two different levels of analysis: (1) The individuals who issue or execute such an
order might be subject to prosecution in a host nation criminal court; and (2)
The commander might feel obligated on a policy basis to refrain from issuing
such an order.
Ifa U.S. military member issued an order or performed an act in the course of
his or her official duties overseas that was a crime under host nation law, the
member could very well be subject to prosecution in a host nation criminal
court. Under many SOFAs, an act done in the course ofa military member's official duties falls within the primary right to exercise jurisdiction of the sending
state, but that rule applies only when the conduct constitutes an offense under
the law ofboth nations, or only under U.S. law. Where the conduct alleged constitutes an offense only under the law of the host nation, the host nation has exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute. The United States has consistently taken the
position that it would be intolerable for a U.S. military member to be criminally
prosecuted for performing an act that is legal under applicable U.S. law, such as
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and which he or she was instructed to perform in the execution of an official duty. A similar issue arose recently in connection with the adoption by several NATO member nations of
domestic laws making it a crime to possess anti-personnel land mines (APLs).
There is no similar crime under the UCl'vij. In several cases, the nations concerned have agreed to permit the U.S. forces to retain their APL stockpiles in the
host nation's territory for at least some period of time. In these cases, either specific exemptions from the host nation law or agreed screening procedures for
prosecutions have had to be devised to prevent prosecutions of U.S. military
members for performing their official duties.
In practice, such prosecutions are most unlikely because if U.S. military authorities become aware that performance of certain information operations
within the territory of a specific host nation, or that produce harmful effects
within its territory, will subject military personnel to possible host nation criminal prosecution, those U.S. military authorities are most unlikely to order that
such operations be conducted. The result will be that U.S. forces are unable to
conduct certain activities they would otherwise conduct, or perhaps they will
have to use forces elsewhere to conduct the operation. The issue thus becomes
not so much one of the prospect of criminal prosecution of individual service
members but rather of a limitation on the conduct of U.S. information
operations.
This consideration may be not only a policy issue- it may involve binding legal
obligations under a status offorces or similar agreement. For example, Article II of
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the NATO SO FA provides, "It is the duty ofa force and its civilian component
and the members thereof as well as their dependents to respect the law of the receiving State .... " Similar language appears in most other SOFAs to which the
United States is a party. Considerable practice has accumulated concerning the
application of this obligation to "respect" the law ofthe receiving state. It has often been argued that the drafters could have said the visiting force must "comply" ,vith host nation law but instead chose the less definite term "respect." The
product of almost fifty years of U.S. practice in implementing SOFAs worldwide appears to be that U.S. visiting forces will generally observe the content of
host nation law, but are exempt from the law's procedural requirements such as
licensing, inspection, and reporting. If U.S. visiting forces seek to avoid the application of the substance ofa foreign law, they generally request the host nation
to grant them a specific exemption or at least to reach an understanding that a
particular host nation law will not be enforced against the visiting forces.
Ifa contemplated information operation activity appears to conflict with host
nation law, the commander concerned might choose to consult with host nation
officials in an effort to resolve the issue. If time or other circumstances do not
permit such consultations, the commander should carefully consider whether
the activities in question should be conducted by forces outside the territory of
the host nation concerned, and in a manner that would not make use of or affect
that nation's communications systems. U.S. military and diplomatic authorities
should be able to manage host nation legal issues ifwe identify them early on and
carefully consider the available courses of action.
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VITI. IMPLICATIONS OF ESPIONAGE LAW
A brief review of the treatment of espionage under international law may be
instructive in predicting how the international community will react to information operations, especially in those mission areas in which the same technical
capabilities may be used for both espionage and information operations, and also
in other areas where reasonably persuasive analogies present themselves.

A. Espionage under International Law.
For our present purposes, espionage may be defined as the covert collection
of intelligence about other nations: Espionage is a much narrower topic than
"intelligence," much of which is collected via open source information, voluntary exchanges ofinformation among nations, and technical means such as satellite imagery and signals intelligence that are generally accepted as legal by the
international community. Roughly stated, covert methods of collecting intelligence are in most cases designed to go undetected by their target, and if detected
they are designed to be unattributable to the sponsoring state. Nevertheless, discovery, attribution, and public disclosure occur fairly often.

B. Espionage during Armed Conflict.
The treatment of spies during armed conflict is well established in the law of
war. A "spy" is defined in the law ofwar as any person who, when acting clandestinely or under false pretenses, obtains or endeavors to obtain information in
the area controlled by a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to a
hostile party. A spy may be a military member or a civilian, and his or her citizenship is irrelevant. Military personnel wearing their own uniforms are not considered to be spies, even if they engage in collecting intelligence behind enemy
lines. Only a person gathering intelligence while relying on protected civilian
status or while wearing an enemy uniform is considered to be a spy under the law
of war. Accordingly, information operations during an armed conflict will not
raise any issue ofspying under the law ofwar unless they involve the presence of
individuals inside enemy-controlled territory who (1) are engaged in collecting
information with the intent of communicating it to a hostile party, and (2) are
wearing civilian clothing or enemy uniforms. It seems highly unlikely that the
notions of" electronic presence" or "virtual presence" will ever find their way
into the law ofwar concept ofspying, for two reasons: (1) If an individual is not
physically behind enemy lines he or she is not subject to capture during the
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mission; and (2) There will be no issue ofacting under false pretenses by abusing
protected civilian status or by wearing the enemy's uniform. This will exclude
most information operations activities from being considered espionage in wartime. Nevertheless, behind-the-lines missions to collect information, or to install devices that enable the collection of information, may well raise wartime
spying issues.
If caught in enemy territory, a spy can be punished, after an appropriate trial,
under the domestic law of the captor. The punishment can include the death
penalty. The nation on whose behalf the spy was acting, however, will not be
considered to have violated any intemationallegal obligation. In addition, ifindividuals who may have engaged in espionage but successfully complete their
missions (that is, they have returned to friendly lines) and subsequently are captured while not engaged in acts of spying, they may not be punished for their
previous acts of espionage.

c. Espionage in Peacetime.
Unlike the relatively well developed treatment of espionage under the law of
war, there is very little authority on the treatment of espionage under internationallaw in peacetime. There have of course been many domestic criminal trials of peacetime spies in many countries, including the United States. By
contrast, there has been almost no activity concerning peacetime espionage
,vithin the international legal system except for public complaints and the expulsion ofimplicated diplomats. This may be because the primary harm done to the
victim nation consists of the fact that certain secret information has been compromised, which is a more abstract and indirect type of injury than dead or injured citizens, property damage, or invasions of territory. The lack of strong
international legal sanctions for peacetime espionage may also constitute an implicit application of the international law doctrine called" tu quoque" (roughly, a
nation has no standing to complain about a practice in which it itself engages).
Whatever the reasons, the international legal system generally imposes no sanctions upon nations for acts of espionage except for the political costs of public
denunciation, which don't seem very onerous.
The consequences for individuals caught spying, however, can be very serious. Such individuals can be tried for whatever crimes their conduct may constitute under the victim nation's domestic law, whether charged as espionage, as
unlawful entry into its territory, or as a common crime such as burglary, murder,
theft, bribery, obtaining unauthorized access to state secrets, or unauthorized
computer intrusions. This fact accounts to some extent for the widespread
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practice of assigning intelligence operatives to embassy staff positions in which
they enjoy diplomatic immunity from prosecution. The only remedy for an offended host nation is to declare such persons to be persona non grata, which obligates the sending nation to remove them from the country.
The treatment of espionage under international law may help us make an
educated guess as to how the international community will react to information
operations activities. As discussed in Section III of this paper on the use offorce,
international reaction is likely to depend on the practical consequences of the
activity. Iflives are lost and property is destroyed as a direct consequence, the activity may very well be treated as a use of force. If the activity results only in a
breach of the perceived reliability of an information system, it seems unlikely
that the world community will be much exercised. In short, information operations activities are likely to be regarded much as is espionage-not a major issue
unless significant practical consequences can be demonstrated.
That leaves the issue ofthe possible criminal liability ofan information operator who may later come into the custody of a nation that has been the victim of
an operation in which he or she has engaged. As vlith a spy, there is no evident
theoretical reason why such an individual could not be prosecuted for violation
of the victim nation's criminal laws. As a practical matter, however, the problems of detection and attribution of information operations activities at the nationallevel are daunting; the likelihood of being able to prove in court that an
individual engaged in a certain information operations activity-while not impossible-seems small.
Finally, it deserves mention that there is an established division of labor
within the u.S. government between the intelligence community and the uniformed military forces concerning "covert action." Generally speaking, the intelligence community conducts covert action operations in peacetime that do
not consist of traditional military activities. It remains to be seen how information operations activities will fall within this division oflabor, especially when
they are associated with military operations other than war.
D. Assessment.
Information operations activities are unlikely to fall "vithin the definition of
spying in wartime, although a limited category of activities related to information operations may so qualifY. Information operations activities are more likely
to fall within the category of peacetime espionage. Perhaps more importandy,
the reaction of the world community to information operations that do not
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generate widespread dramatic consequences is likely to be very similar to its reaction to espionage, which has traditionally been tepid.
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IX. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO RESTRICT
"INFORMATION WARFARE"
As soon as the concept of "information warfare" began to receive broad press
coverage, discussion began ofnegotiating a treaty that would prohibit or restrict
it. A draft treaty text that circulated on the Internet in 1995 said simply, "The
Parties to this Convention agree not to engage in information warfare against
each other." The first public governmental initiative was a resolution tabled by
Russia in the UN's First Committee in October 1998 that apparently reflected a
serious effort to get the UN to focus on the subject. The Russian resolution included a call for states to report their views regarding the "advisability of elaborating international legal regimes to ban the development, production and use of
particularly dangerous information weapons." The United States has taken the
position that it is premature at this point to discuss negotiating an international
agreement on information warfare, and that the energies of the international
community would be better spent on topics ofimmediate concern such as helping each other to secure information systems against criminals and terrorists. So
far there has been little support expressed for the Russian initiative.
There are both similarities and differences between the concept of a treaty to
ban or restrict information warfare and similar efforts to prohibit "weaponization ofspace." One similarity is the political reality that nations lacking a significant new military capability that they perceive will be dominated by a few
wealthy and powerful states have a strong incentive to agree to ban or restrict
that capability. There may be an even greater incentive to prevent interference
with information systems, which all nations possess to some degree, than \vith
space systems, in which only 30 nations are currently active and which are dominated by the United States, Russia, and the European Space Agency. On the
other hand, the number of nations that have any reasonable expectation of developing their own space control systems anytime soon can be counted on the
fingers of one hand, while anyone with a desk-top computer and an Internet
connection thereby has access both to hacker tools and to a wide variety ofimportant information targets worldwide. Accordingly, as nations appraise where
their long-term national interests lie, the calculus is quite different as between
international legal restriction of the "weaponization of space" and similar control ofinformation warfare. With space systems, most states do not e:"'Pect to be
either an attacker or a defender in the near future. With information systems, all
states can reasonably expect to be both.
As with space control, the United States has not yet addressed fundamental
policy decisions about where its long-term interests lie in connection \vith the
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possible international legal restriction of ibfonnation operations. On the one
hand, there is an obvious military interest in being able to interfere with an adversary's infonnation systems, and in being able to protect one's own. Used as an
instrument of military power, infonnation operations capabilities have the significant advantage that they minimize both collateral damage and friendly losses
of personnel and equipment. Their use may avoid unwanted escalation of a dispute or conflict. They are relatively cheap and require much less in the way of
forward basing, deployment, and logistical support than do traditional weapons
and their delivery platforms.
On the other hand, as the nation that relies most heavily on advanced information systems, the United States has the greatest vulnerability to attack. This
concern would seem to drive U.S. policymakers to consider the merits ofinternational restrictions on infonnation operations. If we could negotiate an effective international ban on certain types of infonnation operations activities,
might signing such a treaty best serve our long-tenn national interests?
The subject ofinfonnation operations is of course much more complex than
that of space control, since there are so many more infonnation systems subject
to attack, so many more ways ofattacking them, so many more potential players,
plus constant rapid changes in the relevant systems and technologies. As we have
learned in our internal U.S. policy deliberations, there are great difficulties in
even agreeing on definitions ofwhat ought to be included in discussions of "infonnation warfare" and "infonnation operations." In these circumstances, it
seems unlikely that there will be much enthusiasm anytime soon for negotiating
an international agreement that would significandy restrict infonnation
operations.
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x. OBSERVATIONS
There seems to be litde likelihood that the international legal system will soon
generate a coherent body of "information operations" law. The most useful approach to the international legal issues raised by information operations activities
will continue to be to break out the separate elements and circumstances of particular planned activities and then to make an informed judgment as to how existing international legal principles are likely to apply to them. In some areas,
such as the law of war, existing legal principles can be applied with considerable
confidence. In other areas, such the application of use of force principles to
adopting an "active defense," it is much less clear where the international community will come out, and the result will probably depend more on the perceived equities of the situations in which the issues first arise in practice than on
legal analysis. The growth ofinternational law in these areas will be gready influenced by what decision-makers say and do at those critical moments.
There seems to be no particularly good reason for the United States to support negotiations for new treaty obligations in most of the areas of international
law that are direcdy relevant to information operations. The principal exception
is international criminal cooperation, where current U.S. efforts to improve
mutual legal assistance and extradition agreements should continue to receive
strong emphasis. Another idea that might prove fruitful is to negotiate a treaty to
suppress "information terrorism," but there seems to be litde concept at present
how such an agreement would operate or how it would reliably contribute value
to information assurance and critical infrastructure protection.
There are no "show-stoppers" in international law for information operations as now contemplated in the Department of Defense. There are, however,
many areas where legal uncertainties create significant risks, most of which can
be considerably reduced by prudent planning. Since so many of these potential
issues are relatively novel, and since the actions taken and public positions announced by nations will strongly influence the development ofinternational law
in this area, the involvement of high-level policy officials in planning and executing information operations is much more important at present than is the case
with more traditional military activities.
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XI. NOTES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
I. INTRODUCTION
There are many te:x.1:books and casebooks that provide general surveys ofinternationallaw. Some of the more recent of these are:
Ian Brownlie, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1990)
Barry E. Carter & Phillip R. Trimble, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1991)
Stephen Dycus, Arthur L. Berney & William C. Banks, NATIONAL
SECURITY LAW (2nd ed. 1997)
Louis Henkin, Richard C. Pugh, Oscar Schachter & Hans Smit,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (3rd ed. 1993)
John Norton Moore, Frederick S. Tipson & Robert F. Turner, NATIONAL
SECURITY LAW (1990)
Malcolm N. Shaw, INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1997)
Useful collections ofmaterials on U.S. practice concerning international legal issues include:
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES (1986)
Hackworth, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 7 Volumes (1940-1943)
Whiteman, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 15 Volumes (1963-1973)

Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International LAw, a regular
feature in THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW; and
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS; both of which are publications of the
American Society ofInternational Law. (Web site at www.asil.org)
The United Nations Charter has been widely reprinted. It can also be found at 59
Stat. 1031; TS 993; 3 Bevans 1153.
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The quotation from Chief Justice Holmes appears in THE COMMON LAW
(1881).
Discussions of the effect of war on treaty obligations can be found in the
following:
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES, Vol. I 218-222 (1986)
Whiteman, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 14 490-510 (1970)
Lester B. Offield & Edward D. Re, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW 68-78 (1955)
Ian Brownlie, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 616-617
(1990)
There have been relatively few books and articles published to date addressing
international legal issues in information operations. Among these are:
M.E. Bowman, Is International Law Ready for the Information Age? 19
FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 1935 (1996)
Lawrence T. Greenberg, Seymour E. Goodman & KevinJ. Soo Hoo, OLD
LAW FORA NEW WORLD? THE APPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
TO INFORMATION WARFARE (1997). Published as a monograph by the Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, and in revised form in
1998 by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, the latter under the tide INFORMATION WARFARE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Sean P. Kanuck, Information Waifare: New Challenges for Public International
Law, BARv. INT'L. L. J. 272 (Winter 1996)
Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in Itlternational Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. INT'L. 1. 885
(1999)
Roger D. Scott, Legal Aspects ofInformation Waifare: Military Disnlption ofTelecommunications, 45 NAVAL L. REv. 57 (1998)
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W Gary Sharp, Sr., CYBERSPACE AND THE USE OF FORCE (1999)

ll. THE LAW OF WAR
The views of the U.S. military services on law of war matters are summarized in
military publications such as the U.S. Anny's Field Manual 27-10, LAW OF
LAND WARFARE (1956); Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, INTERNATIONAL
LAW-THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS
(1976); and Naval Warfare Publication i-14M, THE COMMANDER'S
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (1995). In addition,
Burrus Carnahan has compiled a comprehensive research report on U.S. practice
relating to customary law ofwar principles for use by the International Committee of the Red Cross in its ongoing study of worldwide practice relating to the
customary law of war. Unfortunately, neither Mr. Carnahan's study nor the
ICRC study is yet available in published form. Finally, the DoD Law of War
Working Group chartered by DoD Directive 5100.77, "The DoD Law of War
Program," December 1998, has for several years been composing a DoD LAW
OF WAR MANUAL. When it is published it will constitute the most current and
comprehensive statement of the Department's views on law of war matters.
There are also a large number ofbooks and articles commenting on law ofwar issues, which are far too numerous to list here.
Information on law ofwar issues that arose during the 1991 Persian Gulf conflict
can be found in Appendix 0, "The Role of the Law ofWar, " in the DoD report
to the Congress on the conduct ofthe Persian GulfWar, which is reprinted in 31
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS (1992).
The 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral
Powers and Persons in Case ofWar on Land is published at 36 Stat. 2310, T .S.
540.
EUTELSAT's actions during NATO's 1999 bombing campaign in Kosovo
are described in Steven Pearlstein, Serb TV Gets Notice It's Canceled, WASHINGTON POST, May 23,1999.
The significance of the "peaceful purpose" principle to the new
INMARSAT is discussed in a April 15, 1999 letter from the COMSAT Corporation's Office of Legal Counsel to Mobile Datacom Corporation.
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ill. USE OF FORCE
Indicators that the United States considers the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations to constitute an authoritative statement of international law include
"Statement by Richard H. Ginger, U.S. Alternate Representative to the U.N.
General Assembly," DEPT OF STATE BULLETIN 623 (November 1970) and
"Statement by Robert Rosenstock, U.S. Representative to the Si."th Committee (Legal)" in Boyd, DIGEST of UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1977.
The statement by the U.S. delegation to the effect that the 1974 "Definition of
Aggression" Resolution does not constitute an authoritative statement of international law is reported at DEPT OF STATE BULLETIN 155 (February 1975).
The 1994 JCS Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces are published as
Chairman of the Joint ChiefS of Staff Instruction 3121.01. Some portions of this
publication are classified, but its discussion of the use of force in self-defense
against "hostile intent" is unclassified. At this writing in November 1999 a revised version of the SROE was nearing publication. No change is e::-"1>ected in
the principle cited here.
The Caroline incident is reported in many texts, one of the most detailed of
which is 2 Moore, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409-414 (1906).
For an authoritative U.S. statement of the legal basis for the 1986 bombing of
Libya, see "President's Address to the Nation," Apri114, 1986, reprinted in
"U.S. Exercises Right of Self-Defense against Libyan Terrorism," DEPT OF
STATE BULLETIN 1 aune 1986).
A collection of authoritative U.S. statements of the legal basis for the August
1998 cruise missile attacks on terrorist camps in Mghanistan and a chemical plant
in Sudan, as well as other relevant materials, can be found at 93 AM. J. OF INT'L
LAW 161-170 (1999).
The Corfu Channel case is published at 1949 I.CJ. 4.
The Chorzow Factory decision is published at 1928 P.C.I.]. (ser. A) No. 17.
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The U.S. French air traffic tribunal decision is published as Case Concerning Air
Services Agreement Between France and the United States, Arbitral Award ofDecember 9,1978, UNRIAA 417,443-446.
The International Court ofJustice decision in Nicaragua v. United States cifAmerica
is published at 1986 LCJ. 14.
A statement by the State Department's Legal Advisor concerning the legal basis
for U.S. attacks on North Vietnamese forces in Cambodia is published at 62
DEPT OF STATE BULLETIN 765 (1970).
Timothy Guiden has published an extensive article on U.S. operations in Cambodia: Defending America's Cambodian Incursion, ARIz.]. INTL & COMP L. 217
(1994).

IV: SPACELAW
The treaties cited in this section are published as follows:
Outer Space Treaty, 18 UST 2410; TIAS 6347; 610 UNTS 205
Rescue and Return Agreement, 19 UST 7570; TIAS 6599; 672 UNTS 119
Liability Convention, 24 UST 2389; TIAS 7762; 961 UNTS 187
Registration Convention, 28 UST 695; TIAS 8480; 1023 UNTS 15
Moon Agreement, U.N. Doc. AlRES/34, 68 (1979)
Environmental Modification Convention, 31 UST 333; TIAS 9614; 1108
UNTS 151
Limited Test Ban Treaty, 14 UST 1313; TIAS 5433; 480 UNTS 13
ABM Treaty, 23 UST; TIAS 7503; 944 UNTS 13

v. COMMUNICATIONS LAW
At this writing in November 1999 the International Telecommunications Convention of1982 has not yet been published in the USTseries, which is the State
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Department's official compilation of international agreements to which the
United States is a party. This agreement is probably most accessible in
S. TREATY DOC. No. 99-6. The United States is also a party to the Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunications Union of1992,
which replaces the 1982 agreement as between parties to the 1992 agreement.
The two memorandum opinions of the Justice Department's Office of Legal
Counsel concerning broadcasting into Haiti are entitled "Applicability of 47
USC Section 502 to Certain Broadcast Activities" (October 15, 1993) and
"Memorandum for the Deputy Attorney General" Guly 8, 1994).
The 1884 Convention for Protection ofSubmarine Cables and associated documentsarepublishedat24Stat.989, 25 Stat. 1424, TS380, 1 Bevans 89, 112, 114.
The major bilateral and regional communications agreements to which the
United States is a party are listed in TREATIES IN FORCE. Many others are
unpublished.

VI. OTHER TREATIES
Citations to the agreements described in this section can generally be found in
the current TREATIES IN FORCE. Pursuant to DoD Directive 5530.3, "International Agreements," June 11, 1987, a DoD repository and index of unpublished
international agreements relating to military operations and installations is maintained in the Office of the Deputy General Counsel (International Affairs).

Vll. FOREIGN DOMESTIC LAWS
None.

VllI. IMPLICATIONS OF ESPIONAGE LAW
None.

IX. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO RESTRICT "INFORMATION
WARFARE"
The effort by Russia in the £ill of 1998 to get the United Nations to take a firm
stand on restricting information warfare produced only a resolution passed by the
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General Assembly on 4 January 1999 entitled "Developments in the field of infonnation and telecommunications in the context of international security,"
which "calls upon Member States to promote at multilateral levels the consideration of existing and potential threats in the field ofinfonnation security," "invites all Member States to infonn the Secretary-General of their views and
assessments" on infonnation security issues, "requests the Secretary-General to
submit a report to the General Assembly" at its next session, and "decides to include infonnation security in the provisional agenda for its next session." U.N.
Doc. A/RES/53/70 (1999). In August 1999 the Secretary General submitted his
report to the General Assembly. It contained the statements submitted by ten
Member States (Australia, Belarus, Brunei, Cuba, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The Russian statement referred to "infonnation weapons ... the use of which ... can have devastating
consequences, comparable to the effect ofweapons ofmass destruction." It proposed that the General Assembly "adopt resolutions on the question ofinfonnation security with a view to reducing the threat of the use of infonnation for
terrorist, criminal or military purposes," which would help generate "international principles (e.g., a regime, a code of conduct for States) with a view to
strengthening international infonnation security," and ultimately to a "multilateral international legal instrument." Aside from Russia, only Belarus and Cuba
e}"'Pressed support for the development of international legal principles in the
field of infonnation security other than cooperation in suppressing computer
crime and terrorism. The United States and the United Kingdom stated that it
was premature to attempt to fonnulate overarching principles pertaining to infonnation security, and that, for the present, international efforts should focus on
measures to combat computer crime and terrorism. The Secretary General ventured no opinion on the subject. U.N. DOC. A/541213, 10 August 1999.

x. OBSERVATIONS
None
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